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6Executive summary
Key findings
Households in developing countries invest more than donors
or governments in water and sanitation (WATSAN) services,
but these investments are often 'sub-optimal', because of
limited access to finance. WATSAN entrepreneurs, although
they provide critical services particularly for the poor, often
find that their financing needs fall in the 'missing middle'
(estimated roughly at between USD 2000 and USD 100,000).
The issues related to financing WATSAN small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) are little understood at present.
Limited access to financing is a key obstacle for small-scale
finance (SSF) recipients to deliver sustainable services. This
is, of course, not the only constraint, but it is a significant
one, alongside informality, lack of business skills and
affordability constraints.
Few domestic financial institutions (DFIs) are currently
involved in financing small-scale WATSAN providers. In some
countries, such as Kenya, India and Vietnam, the markets for
micro and mesofinance for WATSAN are growing with the
development of lending products such as 'toilet loans' or
'water tank loans'. Some countries, such as Vietnam (which
has mandated the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy to offer
WATSAN specific loan products) and Ghana (which has a
stated policy to roll out sanitation revolving funds [SRFs],
although not yet implemented), have defined sanitation
microfinance as a key pillar of their strategy for reducing the
sanitation access deficit. In many other countries, DFIs are
not very aware of the financial needs of the sector. There is,
therefore, a need to build their capacity and awareness of
financing needs in the WATSAN sector.
SSF is, in theory, not limited to microcredit. There is a
tendency to focus exclusively on microcredit, even though
SSF can include many other financial instruments, such as
savings, insurance, leasing, working capital loans, etc.
Microcredit is somewhat easier to grasp and has been much
better documented. In practice, however, most of the SSF that
has been provided for WATSAN to date tends to relate to
credit. The combination of savings and loans (credit) holds
great promise for facilitating access to WATSAN providers.
Using microfinance for WATSAN is sometimes criticised on
the grounds that access to water or sanitation is not directly
income generating and thus it is difficult for poor people to
obtain a loan to access such basic services. However, a
microloan for WATSAN is clearly income enhancing as it
improves health and well-being and saves time for revenue
earning activities. Besides microcredit, other financial
instruments can play an important role in increasing access
to WATSAN and therefore would warrant further analysis and
documentation.
A survey of EU donors showed their interest in, but limited
experience of, supporting SSF for WATSAN. Public funding
can be used in a variety of ways to support small-scale
WATSAN providers, such as grants for market research and
assisting microfinance institutions (MFIs) to help catalyse
private finance. Donors can improve the market and help
overcome 'misunderstandings' between lending institutions
and community-based organisations (CBOs) by bridging the
divide between their different approaches. They can also help
to improve overall governance in the country to make
conditions more conducive for investment.
Donors can use a variety of financing instruments and
channels to transfer finance to SSF recipients. These
instruments may include grants (in various forms),
concessionary loans, guarantees and equity investments.
Overall, no single financial instrument can be used to trigger
a market response from private finance providers to get them
to start offering SSF services for WATSAN. A combination of
such instruments would need to be used, in order to address
the various market failures identified, although it would be
necessary to keep the overall financing structure as simple as
7possible. Some financing institutions may be more willing to
take one type of instrument vs. another (e.g., NGOs can
accept grants, but seldom can they accept equity
investments). On the supply side, some donors (such as
philanthropic organisations or social investors) may be more
willing to take risks than traditional donors. Blending funds
from various donors, therefore, may be the way to develop a
financing package with an optimal risk profile.
Grants can lever other forms of funding and should be
provided based on performance. They should avoid promoting
'incompetence', which means that if there is no adequate
business plan, there should be no grant. Grants must avoid
distorting the market and interfering with the business of the
banks/microfinance institutions (MFIs) (e.g. by introducing
subsidies that distort the market). In all cases, it is important to
pay attention to the 'soft elements', so as to ensure that
financial institutions or their NGO counterparts also provide
technical and managerial support to SSF recipients.
A key issue is 'getting funds from A to B', given the great
number of SSF recipients and the physical distance between
external support agencies (or governments) and the
recipients on the ground. A number of financing channels can
be considered to that effect. Intermediary institutions are
critical and include Apex institutions, NGOs, microfinance
investment vehicles (MIVs), trust funds or local commercial
banks – these are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Experience shows that supporting MFIs and commercial banks
to expand their services into WATSAN can be more effective
than attempting to impart business and financial management
skills to existing WATSAN NGOs. Building the capacity of
financial institutions to get involved in providing WATSAN
products is critical, as financial institutions have a certain level
of rigour and can be better trusted to collect payments.
Building successful partnerships between financial institutions,
NGOs and other supporting organisations (such as
consultants) is key, however, as NGOs would still be needed for
'soft components', such as hygiene education, demand
creation, community organisation, capacity building or training.
They can also help small-scale entrepreneurs develop business
plans in order to be in a better position to access funding.
Once partnerships have been successfully built, there is likely
to be more demand than can be met by the supply. There is a
role for donors and support agencies in building the capacities
of both MFIs and NGOs and helping to provide an enabling
environment for SSF.
Channelling financing via multi-donor trust funds and Apex
institutions (i.e. national-level agencies) may also be a good
way to reduce transaction costs and leverage the expertise
of these institutions. There are considerable numbers of Apex
institutions and microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs)
already in existence that are not specialised in water, but
which could be informed about the financial needs of the
sector and serve as very useful financial channels.
Both microfinance and mesofinance present market potential
to provide services to the poor. Sanitation is potentially the
sub-sector where needs are greatest and holds great potential
for the application of microfinance. Domestic water services
also require micro and particularly mesofinance, but there are
substantial differences in the financing needs between the two
sectors. Households are the main investors in sanitation
(which usually consists principally of 'on-site sanitation' in
most countries) and, therefore, need access to funding in order
to spread the initial cash outlay required over time. Investment
needs for water systems tend to be more substantial and this
is where CBOs and small-scale independent providers (SSIPs)
would need to access mesofinance, which could also take the
form of leasing large equipment.
Supporting SSF is only one instrument among many others
and it is not a panacea. SSF is best suited to fill the 'missing
middle gap' and to meet the needs of poor households,
although not those of the extremely poor and destitute. Given
that microcredit usually carries fairly high rates of interest,
these would usually prove too high for the extremely poor
who also tend to be excluded from formal financial markets
8(although this is rapidly changing in some countries such as
Kenya with innovative services such as mobile banking). For
the latter, other types of approaches may be needed as part
of a package. One promising approach consists of combining
savings and loans so as to mobilise the necessary funding at
the level of the community itself and leave the community to
be in control of its own savings. This requires that MFIs are
able to take deposits (which is not the case in all countries)
or that savings are done through village savings groups (or
similar structures), which are inherently limited in scale. The
model, developed by Slum Dwellers International (SDI), is an
interesting alternative that allows scaling up. Donors could
help develop this by supporting more research and
development.
What more could external support
agencies do?
Before designing a small-scale financial support scheme for
WATSAN, external support agencies (ESAs) should assess the
organisation of the domestic financial sector as well as that
of the water sector. The financial sector, including
microfinance, is organised differently in each and every
country. Hence it is critical to better understand the
organisation of the financial sector before designing a
financial support scheme for WATSAN entrepreneurs.
Questions to consider include:
 What is the regulatory environment and overall 'financial
system' structure? Are MFIs allowed to take deposits? Is
there a credit bureau in place?
 What is the structure of the 'financial sector'? Who are the 
main actors providing microfinance services, commercial
banks/MFIs/NGOs? What is the degree of 'financial
inclusion' (i.e. access to formal financial services)? Do 
Apex bodies or MIVs exist?
 What is the depth and breadth of the microfinance sector? 
What is the overall size of the microfinance sector? What
range of financial products do they offer?
 What is the level of 'awareness' of the WATSAN sector 
amongst financial institutions?
ESAs should draw on existing experiences with general micro
and mesofinance, including in-house and from other
organisations. Many donors have considerable experience in
supporting SSF for other sectors, such as income-generation
activities, clean energy and agriculture. There is often little
communication between professionals working in
microfinance within the donor organisations themselves or
between them and their counterparts in the WATSAN sector.
Learning from these experiences would help with structuring
WATSAN projects and programmes that incorporate elements
to support SSF recipients. It would also help with using
existing financial channels that have been set up for various
sectors rather than create new ones specifically for WATSAN.
Existing innovative programmes to support SSF for WATSAN
could be built upon and expanded. Some of the programmes
reviewed in this report, such as the Microfinance Water Sector
Activity in Kenya, the Financial Inclusion Improves Sanitation
and Health (FINISH) project in India and water and sanitation
CLIFF (in both India and Kenya), have proven successful at
channelling substantial amounts of funding to SSF recipients.
Much can be learned from the architecture of these
programmes for potential replication. Making incentive
payments to MFIs for boosting sanitation coverage in their
areas of operation under the FINISH programme is particularly
innovative and could provide lessons. Channelling additional
funding to these programmes could be considered by other EU
donors, as these programmes are already in place and there
would be economies of scale in using them as platforms to pull
in financing. The EUWI could act as a mechanism to build
alliances between EU donors to scale up such programmes.
In supporting SSF for WATSAN, ESAs and governments can use
a broad range of instruments and financial channels. The use
of guarantees should be encouraged, under the appropriate
circumstances, and the creation of domestic facilities that can
provide local guarantees should be fostered.
9Subsidies and regulation need to be improved so as to
eliminate contradictory policies and practices that could
limit the use of SSF where appropriate. For example,
microfinance for sanitation is only likely to be viable if
hardware subsidies are simultaneously discontinued.
DFIs should be encouraged to 'mainstream' WATSAN SSF. At
present, many MFIs and commercial banks deal with WATSAN
activities as 'pilot projects' managed by a specific
department (this was the case of K-Rep's handling of the
Kenya Microfinance for Water Projects Activity). Instead, these
activities should be mainstreamed into the main activities of
the financial organisations.
Which concerted actions could be
initiated?
Much still remains to be done in order to increase the level of
penetration of SSF in the WATSAN sector, which means that
concerted actions between ESAs may need to be initiated.
In order to design better actions, it could be important to
start by improving the level of knowledge, particularly on the
specific needs for mesofinance, as this tends to be less
documented than microfinance. Some financing instruments,
such as leasing, have found marginal use in the WATSAN
sector although their potential appears to be large. It would
also be crucial to more systematically monitor the
microfinance market for WATSAN and its impact on
beneficiaries. Existing resources on micro and mesofinance
for WATSAN could be pulled together on a web platform (on a
similar model to that for rural finance) to increase their
accessibility. The ultimate objective would be to stimulate
interest from funders to provide more micro and mesofinance
for WATSAN.
Given that domestic financial intermediaries are essential for
channelling finance, concerted actions to develop national
Apex institutions, for example, could be undertaken.
Establishing or developing an Apex institution can take time
and effort and there would be economies of scale in
developing this concurrently with other activities.
Attention should also be paid to improving the overall
business environment and strengthening the financial
systems. 'Macro' interventions, linked to improving the
overall regulatory environment, are essential and are as
important as developing specific financial products for
WATSAN or establishing dedicated financial channels.
Improving regulation and monitoring can help prevent the
types of crises that have marred the microfinance sector in
India (following a period of extremely rapid growth). The
strengthening of regulatory regimes for micro and
mesofinance is taking place in a number of countries
throughout the world and donors could do more to support
such processes where they are ongoing or about to be
undertaken.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Report objectives
The objective of this report is to identify ways in which
governments and external support agencies (ESAs) can
increase access to finance for small-scale WATSAN providers,
by channelling public funding to support the market and
leverage private sector financing. The ultimate objective in
doing so is to increase access to services for poor
households, who either invest in the services themselves or
rely on small-scale providers.
This report has been developed as part of a component of the
work programme of the European Union Water Initiative –
Finance Working Group (EUWI-FWG), which looks at
enhancing the role of the private sector in WATSAN and how
EU donors can provide strategic support.
Rationale for the report. At present, there is little awareness or
cohesion among ESAs (including EU donors) on the best way to
increase financing for small-scale providers. It is not easy to get
an idea of what their policies are or what they are doing and
how they could collaborate to add more value. Given the
importance of these types of providers for the sector and of
reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), members
of the EUWI-FWG identified the need for a study on this issue
from two perspectives – that of ESAs (also referred to as
donors) and that of DFIs (including MFIs and local banks).
Target audience. This report is principally aimed at ESAs,
including bilateral donors, multilateral institutions, NGOs and
philanthropic organisations. It would also be of interest to
government officials and local agencies looking to
incorporate microfinance and mesofinance elements into the
designs of their programmes. One objective of the report is to
convince agencies, which have not previously considered
increasing financing to that segment, of the importance of
doing so and that it can be done in a cost-effective manner.
Geographic focus. The report draws from examples from a
diverse range of geographies, including urban, peri-urban
and rural areas. Many examples are drawn from East Africa
and India. This is where fieldwork was conducted as part of
the project funded by the EUWI-FWG (Kenya) and as part of a
parallel project funded by DFID via the SHARE research
project (Tanzania and India).
1 A glossary of terms relative to small-scale finance is provided in Annex C to this report. For a broader glossary of financial terms applicable to the WATSAN sector, refer to 
Winpenny (2011).
Box 1. Definitions used in the report1
WATSAN services refer to all water services provided through manmade capital that deal with the supply of drinking
WATSAN services. This includes piped and non-piped water services, as well as on-site and networked sanitation.
Small-scale finance (SSF) is defined as financing below approximately USD 100,000. It covers both microfinance
services (including small loans below a few thousand USD) and mesofinance services (below approximately USD
100,000) to small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
SSF recipients include small-scale WATSAN service providers, ranging from households, SSIPs, small and medium
sized enterprises, equipment providers, CBOs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), user committees and local
governments. These may also include small utilities when those do not have access to standard financial channels.
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1.2 Background to the report
In many developing countries, a substantial segment of the
population is served by small-scale WATSAN providers, which
may include households themselves as well as small-scale
private operators, NGOs or CBOs. These providers often face a
number of difficulties to provide adequate services, including
limited access to finance from either private or public sources.
Small-scale service providers often find themselves in a
'financing availability gap', for funding roughly below USD
100,000. Domestic entities which can, at least theoretically,
provide financing to fill this gap include MFIs (for small
funding amounts, typically of a few hundred Euros) or local
commercial banks (for what is commonly referred to as
'mesofinance' as opposed to microfinance). These two forms
of finance are referred to as SSF in this report.
At present, however, local commercial banks and MFIs rarely
provide this finance as they are unfamiliar with the WATSAN
sector and perceive it to be high risk. Thus there is
inadequate financing to households and small-scale service
providers for WATSAN investments. Consequently, an
opportunity to improve service coverage for the poor is lost,
when the demand and the needs are substantial. This can be
referred to as a 'market failure'.
Public funding, either from domestic governments or
international donors, could potentially be used to correct this
market failure and leverage additional financing for small-
scale WATSAN providers. International donors can rarely
support these providers, however, as there are very few
channels to transfer donor financing to small-scale providers.
Many ESAs (bilateral or multilateral) tend to finance WATSAN
via central governments or utilities operating at the national
level. More rarely, some donors also support sub-sovereign
entities (such as utilities or local governments), either
through grants or loans (generally with a national government
guarantee, but also without in some cases) or in the context
of support provided to national programmes.
Overall, ESAs lack guidance as to how they can channel
financing to small-scale WATSAN providers and leverage
additional financing (from private sources) in the process.
The objective of this report is, therefore, to help fill that gap.
1.3 Methodology
This study is based on three streams, as described below.
Literature review and methodological development. The
study started with a review of existing literature on the role of
donors for leveraging small-scale financing at the local level,
for SMEs, in general, and for a range of infrastructure sectors
(including WATSAN, but also renewable energy). This review
examined what a range of donors are currently doing in this
area (i.e. going beyond EU donors). Information came mostly
from web-based searches and interviews with key informants.
The findings informed the development of all subsequent
study streams.
Survey of EU donors' policies and practices. A survey of EU
donors was undertaken to find out what they are doing in
terms of leveraging local small-scale financing for providers of
WATSAN to the poor. The survey identified the specific
support provided by EU donors which could inform the study.
The survey also solicited the views of donors on the role that
they can play to support SSF to the sector and on potential
initiatives that could be undertaken to develop a coordinated
approach to these issues.
Survey of local domestic finance providers and their interest
in funding the WATSAN sector in Kenya. MicroSave, a Kenya-
based consultancy specialising in microfinance and
promoting financial inclusion for the poor, conducted a
survey of local financial institutions in Kenya (including
commercial banks and MFIs). The purpose of the survey was
to identify which institutions are currently providing financing
to small-scale operators of WATSAN in Kenya and the types of
services that they are providing. The survey explored the
constraints faced by these financial institutions in reaching
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this target group and asked them how they thought donor
financing could be used to alleviate such constraints. Similar
surveys were conducted in Tanzania and India which focused
exclusively on microfinance for sanitation.
In addition, a seminar on 'SSF for WATSAN' was held at the
World Water Week, in Stockholm in August 2011. The
seminar was co-chaired by the EUWI-FWG and SHARE
research programme. Preliminary findings of the work were
presented at this seminar and discussed by an eminent panel
of experts, including Meera Mehta (CEPT University, India),
April Rinne (Water.org), Monica Scatasta (European
Investment Bank) and Vijay Athreye (FINISH programme). The
comments and insights of all participants at the seminar
contributed to the outcomes of the study. The strength of the
debate showed that the issue of SSF for WATSAN is
generating increasing interest.
1.4 Report structure
The remainder of the report is structured as follows:
 Section 2 examines the types of financing needs
faced by small-scale providers of WATSAN;
 Section 3 looks into the types of repayable financing 
to which SSF recipients can potentially have access;
 Section 4 evaluates whether this is an area where 
donor financing can be used to help expand the market, 
how this can be done and what EU donors are doing in 
this area;
 Section 5 examines in more detail the type of
financial instruments that donors can use to support
small-scale WATSAN providers;
 Section 6 evaluates alternative options for 
channelling large funding packages to SSF recipients.
In addition:
 Annex A contains summary findings from the field 
work conducted in Kenya;
 Annex B consists of a glossary of key terms relevant to SSF;
 Annex C includes a list of useful websites and references.
The full results of the survey of EU donors and of the India,
Tanzania and Kenya field work are available as separate
documents on the following websites, www.euwi.net,
www.gwp.org, www.shareresearch.org and
www.watercredit.org.
2. Understanding the market
This section sets out a typology of small-scale WATSAN
providers operating in the sector and outlines their financing
needs. It then examines the type of financing they can
typically access to meet those needs and the common
challenges and constraints they face in doing so.
2.1 Who are the small-scale service providers in
the WATSAN sector?
Small-scale providers of WATSAN are extremely diverse,
ranging from households to SSIPs (such as water 
carriers or people who manually empty latrines), SMEs, 
equipment providers, CBOs, NGOs, user committees
and local governments. Households are considered to 
be 'service providers' when they either 'self-provide' the
service (e.g., by building and operating a pit latrine or 
digging a well) or provide services to others (e.g., when
households who have a tap connection sell water to 
their neighbours).
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Small-scale WATSAN providers serve a substantial portion of
the market, particularly for the poor. In many developing
countries where coverage by 'formal' services is low,
households can be the primary investors in WATSAN
infrastructure, particularly in on-site sanitation solutions or
domestic water resources. This finding was underlined by the
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic report, prepared under
the leadership of the World Bank. This report found that
households in sub-Saharan Africa contributed to almost half
the total capital investments in the WATSAN sector, mostly
through their investments in on-site sanitation facilities. Small-
scale independent providers (SSIPs), which include informal
water vendors or people who empty pit latrines, often serve a
high percentage of the population – up to 90% in some cases
according to World Bank estimates.
With respect to sanitation, which is one of the most 'lagging'
MDGs, governments often expect households to finance the
majority of the necessary investments in the next decade. This
is particularly the case in countries that have stopped providing
hardware subsidies for on-site sanitation and focus on financing
behaviour change campaigns, such as in Ghana and Tanzania.
In Ghana, for example, the Country Status Overview led by the
Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP) estimated that the total
capital expenditure requirements to meet the MDG target stand
at USD 402 million per year. With the adoption of community-
led total sanitation (CLTS) as the government's main policy
direction with respect to sanitation, households are expected to
meet the full costs of sanitation hardware.
Small-scale WATSAN providers face a number of constraints for
providing services, in addition to limited access to finance. A
major hurdle is that they usually lack legal recognition, as
these providers tend to operate in the informal sector and do
not have formal land ownership titles (which may be an issue
when they build and manage networks). They often have
insufficient institutional capacity and limited business skills
and have received little training. They have limited access to
cash and often do not have the required collateral in order to
take out a loan.
2.2 What are their financing needs?
Even though they often operate informally, the types of costs
that small-scale WATSAN service providers need to cover are
similar to those of other types of service providers operating at
a larger scale. They need to invest in hardware and associated
equipment (investment costs), operate and maintain the
facilities (operation and maintenance [O&M] costs, such as
salaries, fuel, electricity, chemicals and spare parts) and set
aside funding for large maintenance expenses, such as
renewing major pieces of equipment (capital maintenance
costs)2. If they have borrowed capital to make investments,
associated financial costs would also need to be covered. Even
though the unit investment costs may be substantially lower
than for large utilities, they nevertheless represent a significant
financial burden when compared to the levels of disposable
income for households or small-scale providers.
Estimating which costs need to be covered and how much
financing is required to cover them are critical steps towards
mobilising adequate financing. To cover their costs, small-scale
service providers can draw from a mix of financing sources,
commonly referred to as 'the 3Ts' – tariffs, taxes and transfers
(Figure 1). Reducing costs through efficiency gains can also be
an important means of freeing up financial resources.
These three sources represent the 'bedrock' for financing
WATSAN and form the basis for 'sustainable cost recovery'
(SCR). SCR entails securing future cash flows from a
2 See www.washcost.info for more information on available methods for estimating life-cycle costs faced by small-scale service providers, particularly in rural areas.
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combination of the 3Ts, and using this revenue stream as the
basis for attracting repayable sources of finance, such as
equity, commercial loans and bonds (depending on the size
of the service provider and on the local situation). While
investment costs may be partly covered through grants (taxes
and transfers), the operating costs, at least, should be
covered through tariffs. As WATSAN investments are typically
substantial and lumpy, mobilising repayable finance is often
needed to bridge a temporary financing gap and help smooth
the burden of these investments over a longer period.
Although the same financing equation applies to small-scale
providers as it does to large-scale providers, their ability to
draw on different sources of revenues is much more limited.
Small-scale WATSAN providers need to invest in a range of
areas, as shown on Table 1. To meet these investment needs,
they can mobilise funds from a range of sources. Small-scale
WATSAN providers rarely receive subsidies from the
government (what the 3Ts refer to as 'taxes') or from
international donors (referred to as 'transfers'). In order to
mobilise sufficient cash for up-front investments, they tend to
draw from friends and family or resort to money-lenders. In
some cases, still rare in the WATSAN sector, they can also
access microfinance or mesofinance from DFIs, such as MFIs
or commercial banks (see Section 3 for more information).
Service providers can then refund this initial investment
through tariffs charged to their customers.
Table 1 shows that small-scale WATSAN providers need
financing for different types of investments depending on the
nature of the investment. To cover the financing needs that
they cannot address from their own revenues or savings, they
can, in theory, access financing from a variety of sources as
shown in the right-hand column. Whether or not such
financing is readily provided by domestic financial markets
will depend on national circumstances.
Figure 1. The overall 'financing equation' for WATSAN providers
Source: Adapted from OECD (2010)
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Type of small-scale WATSAN providers Type of infrastructure for which 
they need finance
WATER SANITATION
Potential financing instruments
Households
Community based organisations
Private enterprise
Household On-site sanitation
connections or facilities
water tanks
Microfinance mechanisms such as:
 Micro loans
 Savings and loans combined
 Group lending and solidarity mechanisms
CBOs, user committees, cooperatives,
neighbourhood organisations and 
self-help groups
Upgrading, Management of
rehabilitation and of community and
extension of small public toilets e.g. 
piped networks/ latrine cleaners
point source and O&M
operators
Micro and mesofinance:
 Medium-term loans (for the community
contribution to the investment and O&M)
 Savings accounts, current accounts, short-
term loans for repair
Small-scale providers 
 Water kiosk operators and carters
 People who empty latrines
 Masons, small construction companies
SME private operators
 Equipment suppliers
 Small water network operators
(e.g. Aguateros)
 Small sewerage network operators
 Private land and housing developers
 Small-scale equipment e.g. gloves, 
carts, protective clothing
 Building materials
 Water tankers  Vacuum tankers
 Larger scale investments for equipment
(as above)
 Distribution networks e.g. building 
small bore sewer network
Micro and mesofinance:
 Short-term loans (working capital)
 Capital investment loans
 Leasing of expensive assets
 Savings instruments
 Current accounts
 Overdraft facilities
Table 1. Types of small-scale WATSAN providers and their financing needs
Source: Authors' compilation 
3. What type of repayable
financing is available to SSF
recipients?
Small-scale WATSAN providers currently have access to a
limited range of repayable financing to cover the up-front
financing needs that they cannot cover themselves. In this
section, we identify what types of repayable financing SSF
recipients have access to, distinguishing between
microfinance for households and mesofinance for WATSAN
providers, including SSIPs, CBOs and SMEs.
These SSF recipients all face substantial constraints in
accessing financing, as shown in Figure 2. As a result, their
financing needs are seldom covered and their ability to expand
their coverage is low. Public sector intervention may be
required in order to trigger a market response and increase the
supply of financing accessible by them (see Section 4).
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Figure 2. Access to finance: the uncovered segments
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3 Since then, for example, Grameen has stopped offering specific water and sanitation loans and merged these with housing loans.
3.1 Microfinance for households
This section focuses on the microfinance provided to
households for investing in their own WATSAN facilities (what
can be qualified as 'home improvement' investments).
What is microfinance?
Microfinance has been practiced for many years in different
forms. It first became prominent in development circles in the
1970s in Bangladesh, with the provision of small loans for
income-generating activities with only minimal collateral
requirements. The most well-known microfinance model that
originated at the time was that of the Grameen Bank.
The microfinance sector has grown considerably in the last 20
years and now encompasses a whole range of financial
services that are provided to low-income clients who
traditionally lack access to banking and related services.
These financial services may include credit products as well
as savings, insurance, fund transfers (for remittances) or a
combination of these. In the case of credit, the loan size
varies considerably from very small loans for household
investments (in the range of a few hundred USD) to larger
loans for micro-business development (several thousand
USD). The funding of small projects with loan sizes that are
above microfinance levels, but are less than USD 100,000,
would usually be classified as 'mesofinance', discussed in
the next sub-section.
The entities providing such services can include MFIs,
commercial banks, non-banking financial institutions, NGOs,
credit cooperatives or solidarity lending groups. Typically, an
MFI would be well established in the community, which gives
it an edge in terms of assessing a borrower's ability to repay
and enables the MFI to rely on peer pressure and community
cohesion to obtain repayment. In addition, NGOs and
microfinance specialists can provide support services to
incorporate microfinance products into the design of broader
development interventions, which may include the
development of tailored financial products and/or brokering
with financial institutions as well as training.
A popular form of micro-lending, referred to as 'group lending',
consists of requiring borrowers to form a small group and to
guarantee each other's borrowing. In some countries (such as
India), these groups are made up of women who share strong
community ties. In this case, peer pressure replaces the need
for collateral, which is often lacking for WATSAN investments as
they are not 'moveable'. Group lending can either work as a
revolving fund (whereby each group member has the ability to
borrow in turn, provided the others have repaid) or as a mutual
guarantee, to minimise the risk of non-payment. From a
lender's point of view, extending a loan to a group of borrowers
provides a higher guarantee of being reimbursed than if it had
lent to an individual.
How is microfinance used in WATSAN?
In the WATSAN sector, microfinance can be used to provide
access to finance to those who would otherwise be excluded,
such as households, SSIPs, CBOs and NGOs. Even though
microfinance as a financing model is now well established
with a solid track record, its application to the financing of
WATSAN has remained somewhat limited and MFIs rarely
offer tailored products for WATSAN.
According to a study conducted by Mehta (2008) for the
Gates Foundation, only a few large MFIs in Asia had achieved
significant scale in these areas. These MFIs include BRAC,
Grameen Bank and ASA in Bangladesh,3 Self Employed
Women's Association in India and the Vietnam Bank for
Social Policy in Vietnam (VBSP) (see Box 2). As Mehta
indicated at the time, "Experiences so far suggest that
although several pilots are available to study, the
sustainability and scalability of the market is still unknown."
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Box 2. The Sanitation Revolving Fund (SRF) in Vietnam: a successful pilot and scaling up
In 2001, a SRF component was incorporated in the World Bank-financed, Three Cities Sanitation Project in Vietnam to
provide loans to low-income households to build on-site sanitation facilities. The SRF provided small loans (USD 145)
at partially subsidised rates to low-income and poor households to build a septic tank, a urine diverting/composting
latrine or a sewer connection. To access the loans, households needed to join a Savings and Credit group, which
brought together from 12 to 20 people who must live close to each other to ensure community control. The loans
covered approximately 65% of the cost and enabled the household to spread the costs over two years. The loans
acted as a catalyst for household investment although households needed to find other sources of finance to cover
total investment costs, such as borrowing from friends and family.
The initial working capital for the revolving funds (USD 3 million) was provided as a grant by the World Bank, Denmark
and Finland. The SRF was managed by the Women's Union, a countrywide organisation representing the rights and
interests of women, which has a long experience in running microfinance schemes. The initial working capital was
turned over more than twice during the first phase of the project (2001 to 2004) and was then transferred to
subsequent phases to be revolved further. Combined with demand generation and hygiene promotion activities, the
SRF helped around 200,000 households build sanitation facilities over the course of seven years. The revolving fund
mechanism allowed leveraging household investment by a factor of up to 25 times the amount of public funds spent.
Repayment rates have been extremely high (almost 100%). This revolving fund programme in Vietnam compared very
favourably with other forms of public support for sanitation, including indicators such as leveraging and effectiveness
(Trémolet et al., 2010).
Since 2004 this pilot approach has since been scaled up via other World Bank-funded projects and through the
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). As of the end of 2011, VBSP had extended 3.5 million loans for water supply
and sanitation and 3.1 million facilities had been built. The share of WATSAN loans as a percentage of the overall
portfolio has been steadily growing year on year, from 0.86% in 2004 to 7.56% in 2009. Growth in WATSAN loan
products is now a key driver of overall portfolio growth – 16% growth in 2011.
Source: OECD (2010) and VBSP's annual reports.
In the last five to ten years, the market for WATSAN
microfinance products has started to take off in some
countries, but has remained modest overall. The boxes below
refer to examples in India and Kenya where microfinance for
WATSAN has been scaled up beyond single pilot projects.
Much remains to be done to take these examples fully to scale.
It is impossible to track with precision the growth of this
market, however, as the majority of microfinance service
providers does not track WATSAN financial products
separately from other products e.g., purchasing a solar
panel). General purpose loans may be used for WATSAN
investments without this being recorded as such.
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From these examples, it appears that microfinance can help
households make WATSAN investments, such as obtaining a
connection to the water or the sewerage network, purchasing
a water tank or building an on-site sanitation facility.
Obtaining a small loan can help households overcome
affordability constraints, as it enables them to spread the
cost of the investment over a longer period of time, which
reduces the burden of the initial cash outlay. Households can
Box 3. Growth of the 'toilet loan' market in India
Historically sanitation activities in India have been carried out using a grant-based model either by the government
(e.g. the Total Sanitation Campaign) or NGOs (e.g. Gram Vikas).
The development of the microfinance model, which offers sustainable financial services on a large scale, has led a
number of organisations to support local MFIs, such as BASIX, to offer loans for building toilets and getting water
connections. This endeavour has been supported by both an initial strong demand for 'toilet loans' among the
population itself and an awareness of microfinance as a potential support to public services activities. Even though
these micro loans are not income generating as traditionally required by a MFI, they are income enhancing and can be
provided to households based on evidence of their revenues and their abilities to repay the loans. The market for
'toilet loans' is growing in India, particularly in rural areas, triggered by these different factors.
Many different financial institutions have expanded their scope to get involved in the 'toilet loan' market. Some NGOs
with WATSAN experience have developed their microfinance activities. This has, in some cases, resulted in a split
between the NGO and a dedicated microfinance institution, as was the case for GUARDIAN (see Box 16). In other
cases, well-established MFIs have developed their WATSAN financing activities. Some of the MFIs providing loans for
sanitation are also looking into acquiring Non-banking Financial Corporation status, which would give them the
possibility to take deposits.
As of late 2011, there had been an estimated 150,000 toilet loans covering the sanitation needs of more than
750,000 people in India, from institutions such as the Bharat Integrated Social Welfare Agency (BISWA), GUARDIAN,
Bihar Women Development Corporation (BWDC), Evangelical Social Action Forum, and Grameen Koota. This is just a
sample based on the information available; there may be many others. Many have received support from Water.org
(see Box 20) or the FINISH programme (see Box 19).
Microfinance is not the only solution for financing access to sanitation. For example, the MFI GUARDIAN believes that it
would be able to reach between 30 and 40% of the population in a given village. This offers good prospects for
improving the quality of life of a substantial group of the population in India.
Source: Trémolet and Kumar (2012).
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Box 4. Growth of the 'water tank loan' market in Kenya
In Kenya, 43% of the population still do not have access to safe drinking water. Women have to travel long distances
in search of water at the expense of any income-generating activity. In areas with heavy rainfall, water tanks are an
opportunity to harvest or store rainwater and use it during dry spells. Water tanks can also be a solution in urban
areas as an alternative to piped water or water from tankers (which is usually expensive).
Water tank loans have become one of the most popular products offered by banks (such as K-Rep Bank Ltd. or Equity
Bank Ltd.) and MFIs (such as the Small and Micro Enterprise Programme (SMEP) and Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT)
Ltd.) in Kenya. Financial institutions have entered into partnership agreements with water tank suppliers in order to
facilitate access to the tanks and reduce the purchase costs. For example, KWFT (the oldest affiliate of Women's World
Banking, which caters for the financial needs of women-headed households) has entered into agreements with three
water tank manufacturers and obtained a 50% reduction in cost as well as free delivery to rural households.
Banks and MFIs promote and market water tank loans to their clients. If the latter cannot purchase the tanks from their
savings, the MFI pays for it up front on presentation of a pro forma invoice. Water tank manufacturers deliver the tank
(sometimes to the bank branch) and the customer makes a regular payment to the financial institution spread over a
period of from 3 to 12 months, depending on the MFI. Delivery of the tank is turned into a public event with various
stakeholders invited.
Water tank loans are usually small loans in the range of KES 5000 to KES 100,000 (between USD 60 and USD 1200).
They are offered at an interest rate of around 20% with an application and insurance fee of 1.5% on average. Typically,
the loan duration is for about one year. For some MFIs, the customer is required to contribute a margin of from 10 to
15% of the loan or the value of the tank to qualify for a loan. In case of default, the water tank serves as collateral. So
far, the repayment rate has been close to 100%. The demand for this specific product keeps increasing given such
factors as water scarcity and the high cost of purchasing water either from a network or from tankers.
Source: EUWI-FWG report, Muruka and Mugweru (2012) - see a summary in Annex A.
either borrow on an individual basis (which is relatively rare) or
through a group. Loans are usually provided for less than three
years (with 12 months being a commonly encountered tenor
for MFIs, although longer-term loans are provided as well). The
loan amount ranges from approximately USD 30 to USD 250
(sanitation loans tend to be smaller), at interest rates in the
range of 20 to 25% (or at standard local market rates).
As microfinance borrowing rates can prove to be high for
some households, microfinance schemes that combine
saving schemes with group lending can help overcome
affordability constraints where MFIs are allowed to take
deposits. A number of savings and loan group schemes can
be put in place to allow combining micro savings with micro-
lending. There is a whole range of group savings and loan
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Box 5. Community based initiatives in Tanzania
SDI is a network of CBOs of the urban poor in 33 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. SDI's mission is to link
urban poor communities from cities across the South to share problem solving strategies. The organisation's focus is
slum dwellers' needs and, particularly, their right to access basic services such as water.
SDI groups use grassroots savings and credit schemes as ways of mobilising urban poor communities as agents of
their own development. The process starts by establishing a crisis credit fund from the small change available in most
households. Women in charge of treasury management of the fund collect these small amounts of money during daily
visits. This in turn creates the opportunities to access grants and loans at favourable interest rates from a wide range
of agencies (local authorities, national government, bilateral development agencies, etc). Some of these resources are
channelled through revolving funds; the initial supply of lending capital comes from donors and only repayments of
early loans are used to finance later loans.
SDI provides sanitation under the umbrella of housing upgrading. Participants are first encouraged to form credit
schemes and apply collectively for loans rather than construct a sanitation block individually. By using a revolving
fund, they benefit from cheaper labour, better materials and more organised construction. The fund encourages
donations from donors and governments to be placed beyond their immediate control with the explicit responsibility
for decision making being in the hands of the communities. SDI tackles mobilisation and sustainability issues by
establishing communities as project drivers. Thus most of the SDI groups work closely with an NGO that provides
technical support and ensures that lenders follow community priorities rather than dictating them. In other words, SDI
federations collectivise and scale up the financial and social resources of poor households, making it possible for a
collective organisation to achieve what individual households could not.
An example of this approach can be found as applied by the Centre for Community Initiatives (CCI), an NGO working in
Tanzania on improving the quality of lives of informal settlements. CCI encourages slum dwellers to form groups
(between 20 to 100 members) and start saving schemes.
To date, CCI has supported the establishment of 52 saving schemes in most of the main Tanzanian cities. Members
contribute anything they can spare to these local saving schemes and, after 2 to 3 months, they are able to access a
small loan for their own housing and sanitation needs.
Each local saving scheme was then encouraged to join together to form a federation at the city level. By grouping
these city level federations, CCI formed the Tanzania 'Jenga fund'. This fund mobilises savings from the federations,
combines them with other sources of funding (NGOs/donors) and gives loans to a variety of large-scale projects, such
as water connections for a whole community. 
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Box 5. Community based initiatives in Tanzania Continued...
According to CCI, the potential of these savings schemes for WATSAN projects is huge. Firstly, they are offering more
competitive interest rates compared to other MFI institutions. They are suited to sanitation projects, given that
triggering sanitation investment requires a 'social process' in which a development minded organisation, such as CCI,
needs to be involved. Without this involvement, mainstream financial institutions or even MFIs could potentially fail.
Hence these saving schemes offer huge potential for water and, most of all, sanitation where the needs are urgent and
remain largely under-funded.
Source: Trémolet and Muruka (2012).
schemes, starting with the village banking model that relies
on cooperatives and associations. In village banking both
share capital and savings deposits are mobilised from
members (sometimes with a match from ESAs). Loans are
made to groups of ten members, benefiting only half of them
at a time and reaching the second half only after repayment
of the initial loans.
There are only a few examples where such schemes have
been used to finance WATSAN investments. One example
where this is currently being attempted is the Jenga Fund,
developed by the Centre for Community Initiatives (CCI) in
Tanzania, which pools savings from its members to finance
housing as well as WATSAN investments.
What constraints limit the use of microfinance for
WATSAN?
There are numerous potential advantages to using
microfinance to support development, as highlighted in Table
2 below. A number of constraints make it difficult for WATSAN
microfinance to really scale up, although many of these
constraints can be addressed through an adequate design of
the micro-credit scheme and improved communication.
Accessing a loan for a WATSAN investment can be difficult for
poor households given that such loans would not be considered
as income generating. Microfinance providers are seldom
familiar with the WATSAN sectors and they would usually prefer
lending for productive activities. This may reflect simply a lack of
familiarity with the sector rather than a deliberate policy of not
lending to the sector. For example, in Tanzania, a survey of
microfinance institutions (including MFIs and commercial
banks) conducted for the SHARE research consortium showed
that few financial institutions had considered lending for
WATSAN investments and that even fewer were aware of the
magnitude of the investment needs at the household level and
of the potential benefits from such investment.
In fact, experience indicates that helping households invest
in WATSAN facilities can generate a stream of benefits for
those households and can be significantly 'income
enhancing'. Income can be achieved through a reduction in
the number of days lost to illness, in lower medical expenses
and an increase in productivity. This in turn boosts revenues
and enables loan repayment (in the case of microcredit).
Such ability to repay was confirmed in the Vietnam and
Indian cases, where a growing number of women are willingly
taking on loans to build toilets and repayment rates are high.
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Households taking on a water or sanitation loan need to
demonstrate their ability to repay the loan from existing
sources of income. As a result, a water or sanitation loan
would typically not be the first loan that a household would
subscribe to, but the second or third loan. From the point of
view of a microfinance institution, this might be a good way
to remain 'engaged' with their customer base and to provide
a mix of financial services on an ongoing basis.
To limit lending risks, many MFIs require customers to have
repaid an initial loan before offering a new one, in order to
ensure that borrowers are not over-indebted and can
maintain their ability to repay. The risk would increase when
customers take on several loans simultaneously from several
MFIs. There are several ways of mitigating such a risk, for
example through group lending providing a guarantee. In
urban and peri-urban environments where community links
may be weaker, this type of guarantee might not be sufficient.
To overcome this problem, some countries, such as Kenya,
have established credit bureaus which are able to provide a
centralised system for checking a borrower's credit history.
Broader constraints may be more difficult to address through
actions in the WATSAN sector. For example, many households
may not have access to any financial services, let alone
finance water or sanitation investments. Households that are
Potential advantages Potential constraints
For households (HH)
For microfinance providers
 WATSAN investments do not directly generate income that can be 
monetised: HH may not be willing to borrow
 Enables HH to spread the cost of their investment, thereby
alleviating capacity-to-pay constraints
 Income enhancing: generates benefits for HH from accessing 
WATSAN, some of which can be monetised, including:
 Time savings
 Reduction in waterborne diseases
 Increased labour productivity
 Increased school enrolment
 Increase in housing value
 There is not necessarily a direct revenue stream to guarantee 
repayment: higher risk for microfinance providers
 Microfinance providers may not be aware of the needs of the 
WATSAN market and be unwilling to lend as they perceive it to be 
too risky
 Could prove a substantial market, given the high needs and 
donors' support, which could then help them reach additional
clients
 Aligns well with the social mission of microfinance
For governments and external support agencies
 Pro-poor targeting: microfinance (microcredit) may not lift
affordability constraints for the poorest: it may only be applicable
to a segment of the population (which would vary in size 
depending on the country) and is not the only means of
increasing access
 Efficient use of funds and high leverage ratios (i.e. the amount of
private funding leveraged for each USD of public funding 
provided): this may, therefore, help free up scarce public
resources to target the poorest
Table 2. Microcredit for WATSAN: the case for and against
Source: Adapted from Trémolet (2011).
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extremely poor or destitute (i.e. with a daily income below
USD 1 a day) seldom have access to microfinance services as
shown on Figure 2 above. People may also be deprived of
financial services because they live in remote areas.
The expansion of mobile phone technology applied to mobile
banking has the potential to change this in some countries.
As the costs of mobile phone technology have fallen and the
mobile technology has been adapted to support financial
services, mobile banking innovation has begun to spread
across and within poor countries. In Kenya, the leading cell
phone company, Safaricom, has realised this potential by
launching M-PESA, an SMS based money transfer system that
allows individuals to deposit, send and withdraw funds using
their cell phone. The system is low cost and does not require
any other registration requirements than a Kenyan passport.
Hence with no limited amount for deposits and no
obligations to have already been through a previous lending
scheme, this mobile phone banking system is able to reach
poorer communities. By January 2010, after a little more than
two years of operation, M-PESA had 9 million customers,
accounting for approximately 40% of Kenya's adult
population. Thus a money-banking system, such as the
example of M-PESA, holds great transformative potential and
might represent a real driver to overcome the barriers to the
expansion of microfinance services. Kenya is the country
where mobile banking is most developed, but such services
are also developing fast in Uganda, Tanzania and Pakistan.
ESAs, therefore, have a role to play in raising awareness and
making the sector more attractive, so as to increase SSF for
WATSAN.
3.2 Mesofinance for WATSAN service providers
In this section, we examine the provision of mesofinance
services to WATSAN providers, such as SSIPs, CBOs and SMEs.
What is mesofinance?
The term 'mesofinance' refers to the financing requirements of
small businesses that are not typically covered by the banking
system. This is a segment of corporate financing that is
generally not very developed or covered either by MFIs or
banks. The segment can be defined as being situated between
the upper credit limit for microfinance loans and the minimum
amount required for traditional bank financing; we have placed
these roughly at USD 2000 and USD 100,000. There is a
missing link between these two limits that means SMEs lack
access to financing and, consequently, cannot develop.
SMEs are one of the main drivers of economic growth in
developing countries. They often account for the major part of
these economies and play a key role in job creation,
investments and innovation. Moreover, their light structure
and flexibility also means that they can make economies
more resilient to crisis. Few of the financial needs of these
small businesses are adequately covered, however.
The mesofinance sector is still underdeveloped and SMEs
remain on the edge of traditional financial circuits. If the need
to develop this market is high, it might offer a window of
opportunity for banks and other financial institutions seeking
to diversify their offerings. For financial institutions, the
business model is substantially different from microfinance.
Compared to the relatively fast and standardised operations
for microfinance, SME financing requires due diligence of the
business proposal and higher transaction costs per client.
How is mesofinance used for WATSAN?
The use of mesofinance for WATSAN, although no less
important than that of microfinance, is much less
documented. It is also very difficult to track because
mesofinance providers usually consider this type of financing
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as standard 'SME loans', without recording the nature of the
business. The size of the loan would depend on the size of
the business itself (for very small businesses, such as the
manual emptying of pit latrine, loan sizes may be closer to
microfinance than to mesofinance).
There are a few examples where mesofinance has been used
for WATSAN. The example of the Kenya Microfinance for Water
Projects Activity, developed by the WSP, GPOBA (Global
Partnership on Output-based Aid) and K-Rep, is one that is
frequently put forward as an example of how mesofinance
can be leveraged through the targeted use of donor funds
(see Box 9 for more details). In that case, the maximum loan
amount was just over USD 100,000 although the average
loan size was about USD 50,000.
Other examples can be found in the literature. For example,
in Kampala, Uganda's capital, the local authorities tried to
improve the sanitation situation in the slums by constructing
highly subsidised public toilets. Most of these have been
closed down because of the lack of ownership and collective
responsibility. Therefore, many people were still practicing
open defecation, worsening cholera and diarrhoea outbreaks.
To overcome this, a public-private partnership was
established as described in Box 6 below.
In Tanzania, WaterAid has been working for some years now
to support the adoption of a 'gulper technology' for emptying
latrines in Dar es Salaam. Most recently, they have assisted
small entrepreneurs and CBOs to access mesofinance. This
has been difficult (as detailed in Box 7 below) and has not
achieved scale so far.
A specific type of financing that could smooth out the
investment costs for the service providers is leasing, as
described in Box 8 below. WATSAN providers are usually
Box 6. Public-private partnership (PPP) for sanitation in Kampala
To improve sanitation in some of the most affected informal settlements in Kampala City, the City Council/Uganda
Government, with support from German Technical Cooperation (GTZ now GIZ), established a PPP with two local private
companies engaged in the production of modular plastic toilets (Crestanks and Polifibres). This partnership facilitated
production and distribution of sanitation products that are designed especially for the urban poor population. At the
community level, a two year pilot project took place based on a practical intervention which was designed to create a
demand through smart sanitation marketing. The stakeholders, including beneficiaries, suppliers, the Kampala City
Council, MFIs and local NGOs, were mobilised to work together during the sanitation marketing campaign. The people
then had the opportunity to ask for a meso-credit to buy a pay and use toilet and become entrepreneurs. They made
informed choices based on investments and O&M costs and their own ability to pay, without subsidies, the
manufacturer's price, which is about 15% lower than the retail value. After two years, the project appears to have been
a success; new local sanitation entrepreneurs have recovered their investments and continue to expand their
business by adding showers and laundry services.
Source: Nuwagaba (2010).
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unlikely to access standard medium-term loans to finance
expensive equipment. Usually, the upper credit limit amount
of MFIs is too low while the formal bank requirements,
especially collateral, are too stringent. In order to overcome
this financial barrier, leasing might be expanded as an
alternative instrument for solving the initial investment
hurdle. Although leasing could help WATSAN entrepreneurs
smooth out the cost of their investments and reduce the need
for initial capital outlays, its use has remained very limited in
the sector so far.
What constraints limit the use of mesofinance for
WATSAN?
WATSAN providers are looking for financing to help them run
their services more efficiently and generate income. As a
result, lending to this type of provider is comparable in nature
to lending to other types of income-generating activities.
Financial institutions, which are used to lending for income-
generating activities, would, therefore, be more comfortable
with this type of activity.
Box 7. A revolving fund to enable CBOs to purchase gulper equipment in Tanzania
In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's biggest city, only 10% of the city is connected to the central sewage system. The pit
latrines often over- flow and latrine emptying is infrequent, dangerous and unhygienic. To solve this problem,
WaterAid Tanzania, an NGO, is pioneering a low cost pump attached to tricycles that empties up to six latrines a day in
unplanned urban settlements. Once the latrine has been emptied using the 'gulper pump', a specially designed
vehicle called a Piki-Piki is used to transport the waste to the city treatment plant for safe disposal. This equipment,
tailored to the needs of poor communities in densely populated areas, is helping to reduce diseases such as cholera
and typhoid.
In order to finance acquisition of the gulper pumps and tricycles, WaterAid Tanzania sought to link the CBOs they were
working with to commercial banks and/or MFIs. This approach had only limited success. Most of the CBOs have not
met the banks' requirements, in terms of presenting a viable business proposal and evidence of strong and stable
management. These factors led to delays and prompted WaterAid Tanzania to develop an alternative funding
approach to deploy the gulper pumps involving the setting up of a revolving fund.
WaterAid Tanzania could not directly fund the CBOs, but placed an initial supply of lending capital (TZS 10 million or
USD 7407) with a local manufacturer in charge of developing the gulper pump and supplying the tricycle trucks. The
CBO borrows 100% of the cost of the total equipment from the local manufacturer. As each set of equipment costs TZS
5 million, the initial amount allocated by WaterAid Tanzania enabled only two CBOs to access the funds to purchase
gulper pumps. These two CBOs now provide sanitation services in Temeke district in Dar es Salaam. The repayment of
the loans by the CBOs to the local manufacturer will be used to produce new gulper pumps and tricycle trucks for
other CBOs, based on the concept of a revolving fund.
Source: Trémolet and Muruka (2012).
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Box 8. Leasing, a solution to overcome the initial investment hurdle?
Leasing is a contract which enables one party (the lessee) to have the right to use equipment by paying small
instalments to the party that owns the equipment (the lessor). This type of contractual arrangement benefits both
parties as the lessee generates cash flow from the use of the equipment whilst the lessor receives income from
leasing the equipment without losing the right to own it. Leasing is also a form of financing which has no, or very few,
collateral requirements (as the leased asset serves as collateral) and, therefore, can provide a launch pad for many
potentially successful SMEs whose loan applications are often rejected because of a lack of collateral.
Leasing can take pressure off the SME's as the cash flow is spread evenly over the lease period, allowing the lessee to
save cash. Leasing can provide a solution to the financing of machinery, land and equipment for SMEs, which can
include water tankers or gulpers. The lessor (the public authority or the financial institutions) owns the water or
sanitary equipment until it has been fully paid for by the instalments of the lessee (the WATSAN provider). The WATSAN
provider generates cash flows from the use of the equipment. A part of its benefits is paid to the lessor through small
instalments. Once the full cost of the equipment has been repaid, the WATSAN provider is the full owner.
Kenya has acquired experience with leasing water tankers to small entrepreneurs. In Nairobi, the water ministry is
reviving eight water schemes to ease the pressure on water resources in the city, but many peripheral areas will
remain underserved. In this context, the government is leasing water tankers to small-scale water providers in order to
provide water services in remote areas. This arrangement is a win-win arrangement for both the public authorities and
the WATSAN providers. The government ensures the provision of water in these remote areas and, by providing filling
points, encourage water tankers to use only authorised water sources. It also provides the means for WATSAN
providers to acquire tankers. They are then able to deliver water at a lower price. Hence leasing can be an attractive
form of financing for WATSAN providers which warrants further expansion.
Source: Katongole (2007).
There is frequently a gap in domestic financial markets,
however, which is referred to as 'the missing middle'. The
small-scale WATSAN providers and SMEs looking to develop
services would usually be unable to access domestic lending
markets as their financing needs would typically fall into such
a 'missing middle' category.
In addition, the small-scale WATSAN service providers are
often operating in the informal sector and are small and
poorly run. Managers have not been trained in basic business
practices and would be unaware of the basic requirements of
financial institutions when they review a loan application and
enter into an agreement. Financial institutions are usually
unaware of the financing needs of the WATSAN entrepreneurs
and are likely to perceive them as very risky. The lending
terms that they offer may not be appropriate. Interest rates
may be too high or maturities too short and not match the life
of the WATSAN investments.
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4. How can public funds be used
to increase finance to SSF
recipients?
As discussed above, domestic financial markets are often
inadequate for covering the financing needs of SSF recipients
in the WATSAN sector. Public funding is also limited, but it
could be used more effectively to unlock SSF for WATSAN.
This section examines the rationale for using public funds to
foster increased financing flows to SSF recipients and
presents the experience of EU donors in this area. It is based
on the results of a survey of EU donors conducted for the
purpose of this study between April and June 2011. A full
write-up of results from the survey is presented in a separate
report. The objectives of the survey were to understand what
EU donors are doing in the area of SSF, in general, and
whether they are providing/supporting SSF for WATSAN, in
particular. This survey was limited to donors originating from
the EU – mostly bilateral donors – and the two European
multilateral donors, the European Commission and the
European Investment Bank (EIB).
4.1 Should public sector support be provided to
leverage SSF?
There are a number of factors that justify the use of public
funds to support the development of SSF for WATSAN. Overall,
EU donors, who were consulted as part of the survey, agreed
that SSF would help the poor, even though lack of finance is
not necessarily the main obstacle (other factors, such as lack of
formal business practices, can be a very significant barrier).
The main rationale for calling on public funds to support the
expansion of financing to SSF recipients is that we are in the
presence of a classic case of market failure. As set out in
Section 2.1, SSF recipients are serving a large part of the
market, but their access to financing is very limited.
Addressing these market failures may require initial public
funding in order to 'kick-start' the development of financial
markets that meet their needs.
Previous analysis has shown that supporting this type of
intervention can be very cost-effective compared to
subsidised approaches (Trémolet et al., 2010). Scarce public
funds can be used to leverage commercial funding, resulting
in high leverage ratios (defined as the amount of private
funding leveraged from commercial sources through public
funding). In initial phases, leverage ratios may remain
modest, but can increase over time.
Microfinance may be particularly useful for sanitation, as
most governments (and their development partners) have
moved away from a policy of providing hardware subsidies
(i.e. constructing latrines that end up never being used) to
one of supporting behaviour change, demand creation and
supply side responses (see Box 10 for more details). A
number of governments (such as Ghana) are pinning their
hopes on the use of microfinance to help households get
access to the services (particularly for sanitation) as well as
to help small-scale entrepreneurs develop their offerings.
There are several models, each with their pros and cons, and
no one-size-fits-all. More work is needed to develop those
models that are found to suit local conditions so that they
can be expanded.
Some opponents of using public funds to support small-scale
providers argue that the latter are only a 'temporary solution'
and that financing them would mean endorsing their
informality. However, a 'temporary solution' and 'informality'
may be what is needed initially, as they can evolve to more
formal mechanisms over time. It can be argued that providing
SSF recipients with adequate financing could, therefore, help
them formalise their operations and reach more customers in
a manner that only they can.
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Another common argument against supporting micro and
mesofinancing is that these initiatives may not be the
appropriate instruments for reaching the extremely poor and
destitute. However, SSF can make a substantial contribution
for the poor and vulnerable non-poor, especially in rural and
peri-urban areas that are not reached by utilities. As a result
it can help free up resources for targeted interventions to
reach the poorest and hardest to reach, such as through
direct support, hardware subsidies (preferably ex post),
conditional cash transfers, etc.
A limiting factor is that it is very difficult for European donors
or even central government representatives to assess the
risks associated with SSF recipients at a local level. This
means that the monitoring and transaction costs for ESAs of
funding such a multiplicity of actors is, potentially, very high.
4.2 What experience do EU donors currently have
in this area?
This section presents a summary of EU donor activities and
experiences in channelling SSF to WATSAN. A more extensive
presentation of findings has been prepared as a companion
report.
According to the survey, EU donors have limited experience of
either providing SSF directly to WATSAN providers or
catalysing its provision by other financiers. Most EU donors
are focused on lending at the national level to public actors
(including ministries and public utilities) and more rarely deal
with local governments. None of the donors consulted have
financed SSF recipients directly, for obvious reasons. Indeed,
it is almost impossible for an EU-based donor to finance a
multiplicity of SSF recipients in developing countries and they
would need to use a variety of financing channels in order to
reach them (see Section 6).
Given the multiplicity of financial channels and the
decentralised nature of many EU donor institutions,
information is difficult to track and no EU donor was able to
provide aggregated data on how much of the financing they
provide ends up going to WATSAN SSF recipients. Instead,
they were able to provide examples of cases and activities
that benefited those recipients.
Some EU donors have supported the establishment of
specific programmes that channel funding to SSF recipients.
For example, the Netherlands Directorate-General for
International Cooperation (DGIS) is funding the FINISH
programme in India. This is a multi-partner programme that
finances and provides technical support to MFIs in Indian
states to facilitate access to sanitation by one million people
(see Box 18 for more details). DFID and the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) are the
key funders of the Community-led Infrastructure Finance
Facility (CLIFF). CLIFF acts as a funnel for channelling
financing to small-scale slum upgrading projects, including
affordable housing, WATSAN (see Box 11 for more details).
They have recently extended the programme and roughly
doubled their combined participation.
A number of EU donors (such as Sida, DFID and DGIS) have
chosen to channel funding to multi-donor trust funds that
have experience in SSF, such as WSP or GPOBA. The activities
of these trust funds are presented in more detail in Sections
5 and 6. They provide block grant funding to these
programmes, however, and are not involved on a day-to-day
basis with the details of their operations.
Other EU donors, such as the EIB and l'Agence Française de
Développement (AFD), have limited experience of SSF to date,
but have expressed strong interest in developing their
activities in that area, as they recognise the importance of
financing this market segment in order to reach the poor.
Both organisations have extensive micro and mesofinance
activities in other economic sectors, but there are limited
internal linkages between the departments dealing with
those activities and those dealing with WATSAN. In fact,
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almost all EU donors have in-house expertise on micro and
mesofinance, but are not necessarily using it to inform the
design of WATSAN projects. This could be seen as a key area
for improvement.
A few donors have looked into expanding their activities in
this area but subsequently decided against it. Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
conducted studies in Kenya and Uganda to evaluate the
extent to which domestic financial markets were serving the
financing needs of WATSAN SSF recipients and how they
could provide funding to address potential market gaps.
However, they decided not to take a pilot project forward, but
instead focused on building formal financial systems and
strengthening utilities.
The survey also asked EU donors for their views on whether
or not SSF for WATSAN was a suitable strategy. Most EU
donors agreed that improving access to SSF can enhance
poor people's access to WATSAN and that donors have an
important role to play in doing so (although GIZ was more
circumspect). Donors agreed that SSF for WATSAN can be a
tool to help the poor, but, in general, not the ultra-poor. Most
of them agreed that the lack of revenue generation
associated with water investments (for households) should
not be seen as a constraint limiting the potential of SSF and
that, in any case, revenue generation exists in financing for
SSIPs, masons, etc.
There was less agreement on the types of financing tools and
channels that can be used to support SSF. The survey results
helped highlight the fact that EU donors use a broad variety
of financial instruments and channels and that there is,
therefore, a need to draw out more systematically what the
advantages and disadvantages of these methods might be.
Finally, EU donors felt that there was scope for cooperation in
taking ideas further towards joint implementation. These
could include conducting joint projects to:
 Establish public facilities at the national level to channel
small-scale financing (e.g. guarantee funds, revolving 
funds, domestic development banks, etc.);
 Establish or strengthen Apex institutions to channel
financing (see glossary for a definition);
 Work jointly on improving the business/regulatory
environment for WATSAN SSF providers;
 Establish a website/web-based network to coordinate 
learning on small-scale financing for WATSAN;
 Prepare a guidance document on 'how' donor finance can 
be channelled and used to catalyse other sources of
finance for non-utility WATSAN service providers.
5. Potential financial instruments
to support SSF
Public support for expanding the financial services market for
SSF can be provided in several ways. Initially, donors focused
on creating special revolving funds, often with guarantees
(Honduras, Lesotho, Philippines and Vietnam). Though these
programmes did achieve some success, there were questions
over their sustainability once donor funding stops. More
recently, donor efforts have focused on creating linkages with
local MFIs and banks. Though these are still at very initial
stages, they do seem to focus both on scaling up and
ensuring sustainability.
This section examines the types of financial instruments that
can be used to support access to SSF. Choosing between those
instruments should be driven by an identification of the issues
(or 'market failures') preventing an adequate supply of
financing to those agents, as shown in Table 3 below.
This section provides examples of donors using those
financing instruments. These examples are drawn from the
three study pillars underlying the present report, i.e.
including the literature review, the survey of EU donors and
surveys of DFIs in Kenya, Tanzania and India. It also draws on
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a broader range of 'donor experiences', including donor
agencies from outside the EU, international NGOs or social
venture funds. Where applicable, lessons from the use of
these financing instruments to support small-scale financing
in other sectors are also included.
5.1 Grant funding
This section focuses on grants that can be used to increase
access to SSF for WATSAN in order to increase access to
services. Public subsidies, if successful, can help leverage
other sources of finance, such as deposits (in the case of
savings and loan schemes) or commercial financing.
How to make the best use of grants
The basic principle behind a grant (also referred to as a
'subsidy') is that it is public funding that does not have to be
repaid. Grants (or subsidies) can be very useful to address
'market failures', where the functioning of the market does
not yield an outcome that maximises benefits for society as
a whole.
Grant funds can be provided to cover various needs, as
presented in generic terms below:
 A 'capital grant', also referred to as a 'hardware subsidy' 
supports the purchase of property, the construction of a 
facility or the purchase of equipment;
 An 'operating grant' provides support for the day-to-day
costs of running an organisation. Funds provided for 'soft
activities', such as market research or capacity building, 
can be referred to as 'software support' or a 'software 
subsidy';
 A grant provided as 'seed financing' can provide initial
capital for a revolving fund or help with the launch of a 
new organisation.
In the past, grants have often been provided without any
performance requirements. This has contributed to the lack of
financial sustainability and overall poor performance and to a
negative view of subsidies.
In recent years, there has been a clear move away from direct
project-based grants by some of the EU bilateral donors
Issue to be addressed Role of public funding Potential financing instruments
MFIs/commercial banks are not familiar
with WATSAN and vice versa
Existing finance terms are inadequate:
interest rates are too high for SSF
recipients, loan tenor is too short
Limited capital available
SSF recipients lack the necessary skills
to 'access' financing
Improve knowledge and exposure to
WATSAN in financial institutions
Improve lending terms and reduce
borrowing costs
Provide access to capital
Develop SSF recipients' professional
and business skills
 Grants for market studies
 Grants for new product development
 Grants for training and dissemination
 Guarantees
 Blending of grants and loans
 Funding for credit bureaux to lower perceived 
'credit risk'
 Seed financing for revolving funds (grant or loan)
 Guarantees
 Grants for training in business skills for SMEs, 
including WATSAN
 Technical assistance grants
 Equity investments with associated business
support ('angel investors')
Table 3. Role of public funding to support SSF services to WATSAN
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towards budgetary support on the one hand and
performance-based financing and 'smart subsidies' on the
other. The move towards budget support is based on the idea
that poverty reduction can best be met by strengthening
public sector institutions so that they take greater ownership
and responsibility, enabling them to address development
issues themselves. Budget support may lead to increasing
support to SSF recipients, for example when it is used as
grants to rural CBOs to expand services. But it is difficult to
assess this specifically given that budget support by
definition is not earmarked.
'Smart subsidies', however, can be used very effectively to
leverage domestic funding for SSF recipients. As Jonathan
Morduch puts it on the www.financialaccess.org blog, "The
idea behind a smart subsidy is that subsidies are neither
inherently useful nor inherently flawed. Their effectiveness
depends on how they are designed and deployed."
There are several concrete ways in which subsidies can help
increase the availability of SSF and open access to
commercial funds. Subsidies can help by demonstrating and
testing innovations. Research and development (R&D) is
often challenging to self-fund if future returns are not
expected to be very high; the benefits of R&D are enjoyed
widely by the sector as a whole while the costs are borne by
the innovator alone. External subsidies provide important
support that allows organisations to experiment with new
models and products. Given that micro and mesofinance for
WATSAN have yet to be scaled up, there is still a need to
support financial institutions in the development of new
products tailored to the needs of WATSAN SSF recipients.
Subsidies can also help institutions reach costlier, harder-to-
reach customers.
Grants can either be provided ex ante (before the service they
support has been effectively delivered) or ex post (after pre-
specified outputs have been delivered and verified).
Providing a grant ex post can provide a stronger guarantee
that the service is delivered to the right people, as it allows
targeting specific poverty groups if needed.
Typically, ex ante grants to leverage SSF can be provided for a
number of purposes:
 To support the providers of finance, i.e. financial
institutions, to help them provide targeted services (by
funding market research, financial product development, 
capacity building, internal system development, training, 
etc.) or to give them access to capital at a cheaper rate 
(e.g., seed financing for revolving funds). This was
provided by the World Bank, Finland and Denmark in 
Vietnam for the establishment of a SRF, (see Box 1 above);
 To strengthen the capacity of finance recipients, i.e. 
small-scale providers of WATSAN services, by supporting 
the formalisation of their services and preparing them to 
access financing, for example, by funding the 
formalisation of their services, acquisition of business and
management skills, preparation of business plans and 
financial projections;
 To strengthen the financial system as a whole, for 
example, by funding the establishment of a credit bureau 
to assess borrowers' credit histories or a rating system to 
evaluate the solidity of financial institutions.
Alternatively, grants can be provided ex post. Results-based
grants could support the development of microfinance
products for sanitation entrepreneurs, by providing financial
institutions with a subsidy for each new loan extended to a
WATSAN entrepreneur. The FINISH programme in India has
been experimenting with this type of output-based subsidy
for financial institutions, to give them incentives to expand
sanitation services at the community level in various ways
(see Box 18 for more details). Ex post subsidies or grants can
also be used to leverage commercial financing from
commercial banks or MFIs, resulting in the blending of both
types of financial instruments. This is what was tested in the
'K-Rep' project in Kenya, described in Box 9 below. Following
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Box 9. Using output-based grants to leverage mesofinance in Kenya
The WSP and K-Rep Bank Ltd4 developed a pilot project for supporting local water service providers in Kenya that
combines mesofinance with output-based subsidies to ensure an appropriate focus on network extensions.
The Kenya Microfinance for Water Projects Activity was launched in 2007. Funding for implementation of the project's
pilot phase, approximately USD 1.1 million, was provided by the World Bank's GPOBA. The objective of the pilot
project was to increase access to, and efficiency in, water supply services by the poor in the rural and peri-urban areas
of Kenya and particularly in the Athi Water Services Board region. Following the Kenyan Water Act of 2002, the
Community Water Project (CWP) signs a service provision agreement with the Water Service Board in whose
jurisdiction it falls. The WSP chose to focus the project on addressing the needs of CWPs in Kenya, which are
numerous and represent a large market.
Under the project, GPOBA provides capital subsidies to the CWPs selected through a transparent and demand
responsive approach. Each CWP sub-project is pre-financed through a combination of its own resources as equity,
accounting for 20% of the investment needed, and a loan from K-Rep Bank for the remaining 80%. K-Rep Bank follows
its normal due diligence process for providing this loan. Upon successful implementation of the sub-project and
certification of the outputs by an independent programme audit consultant, a subsidy, reflecting 40% of the total
eligible project costs, is provided to the CWP, allowing the CWP to prepay part of the loan from K-Rep Bank and helping
to keep debt service payments affordable.
This provides better risk management from the lender's perspective and increases the incentives for the CWP to complete
the project, as the full subsidy is only transferred upon delivery of the agreed outputs (including an increase in the number
of connections and in revenues collected). After the release of the subsidy, the MFI remains responsible for collecting the
remainder of the loan that is to be covered from water revenues. Technical assistance grants are also provided to assist
with project development. Each community project receives a grant for management assistance during project
implementation and during the first year of operations. Those arrangements are summarised in the following Figure.
4 K-Rep Bank Limited (http://www.k-repbank.com/) was officially established in Kenya in 1999, with a focus on microfinance, SMEs, poor households and development-
oriented enterprises. See Box 17 for more information on the institution itself as opposed to the pilot project.
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Box 9. Using output-based grants to leverage mesofinance in Kenya Continued...
Loan product characteristics. The maximum loan value is KES 10 million (USD 107,526). The CWP (borrower) has to
deposit 20% of the loan amount as cash collateral. The loan attracts an interest of 16% per annum on a declining
balance basis (the effective interest is estimated to be +/- 9%). The loan term is a maximum of 5 years (60 months)
with equal annuity payments and a 12 months grace period. To secure the loan, K-Rep has established a number of
arrangements and purchased a partial credit guarantee from the USAID Development Credit Authority that covers 50%
of the loan loss in the event of a default happening within the first two years for each sub-project.
Donor support received. In December 2007, GPOBA signed a grant agreement with the EU Water Facility for an
additional EUR 1.5 million to expand the number of target projects to 55 throughout the country. In addition, a Public-
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility granted the Water Services Trust Fund another USD 523,000 to pilot a matching
grant system to support communities in engaging consultants to assist with the preparation of loan applications.
Project results and scaling up. Initially the project screened 42 community systems and conducted pre-feasibility
studies for 21 sub-projects from communities within the Athi Water Services Board area. This screening familiarised
the stakeholders with the capacity of WATSAN organisations. Although initially slow, the project showed much
progress between 2008 and 2009, with the identification of in excess of 13 eligible sub-projects for financing,
approved lending of more than KES 56,670,423 (USD 717,000) and receipt by K-Rep Bank of 19 unsolicited proposals.
Lessons learned. The pilot project was designed to address some of the constraints weighing on water service
providers in reaching communities through mesofinance, which included the limited exposure of MFIs to the water
sector and/or project finance, interest rates and tenors beyond what is affordable and a lack of up-front collateral for
small piped water systems.
From K-Rep's point of view, the motivating factors for taking part in the project included i) the return on the loan
capital and ii) the potential for increasing customer outreach and related business (see Box 16 for more details on the
nature of the institution). For example, K-Rep Bank plans to market financial products to the users of the water
systems that it finances, such as a specialised cow leasing product for customers involved in dairy farming. The pilot
established a simple project financing cycle that exposes both the bank and community water projects to each other.
The pre-financing engagement exposed the community project management to the requirements of the financing
institutions and exposed the bank to the dynamics of community water projects.
Source: Mehta et al., 2007, quoted in OECD (2010) and Muruka and Mugweru, 2011.
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Box 10. Using public sector grants to support improved access to on-site sanitation
So-called 'hardware subsidies', whereby governments and donors invest directly in building latrines and handing them out
for free to beneficiary populations are gradually being phased out. This is based on the experience that 'handed-out'
latrines do not get used if they are not preceded by behaviour change and demand promotion campaigns. Many countries
are, therefore, changing their sanitation policy to emphasise behaviour change campaigns (using methods such as CLTS)
and sanitation marketing (to train latrine builders and instil in them a marketing and commercial approach).
With this type of policy, households become the main investors in on-site sanitation. Some households might be able to
invest from their own funds (income or savings) whilst others would need to borrow from a variety of sources in order to
mobilise the funds necessary to cover the initial capital costs.
Public funders looking to support access to sanitation, therefore, have to diversify the types of subsidies to boost
sanitation coverage. They will need to include software subsidies for demand creation, smart subsidies to microfinance
organisations and direct income subsidies (means-tested) to support those households who cannot afford to invest in on-
site sanitation, either from their own funds or from borrowed funds. These alternative uses of public funding to support on-
site sanitation are shown on the figure below.
Source: Author
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Box 10. Using public sector grants to support improved access to on-site sanitation Continued...
Analysis of alternative financing mechanisms for on-site sanitation (see Trémolet et. al. 2010) found that providing
seed financing to a revolving fund in Vietnam, for example, was a much more effective use of public funds (in terms of
leverage ratio and reach of the project) than providing hardware subsidies as was the case in Senegal or Ecuador.
a successful pilot supported by the WSP, the local commercial
bank, K-Rep, has received a number of unsolicited applications
demonstrating the interest generated by the scheme.
Different types of subsidies can be combined to support
certain interventions, such as households building on-site
sanitation facilities, as detailed in Box 10 below. As many
donors and governments have abandoned policies based on
high levels of hardware subsidies, they are looking for
alternative ways of funding sanitation. Households are now
considered to be the main investors in on-site sanitation and
subsidies are needed in order to improve on the lack of
progress in meeting the MDG sanitation target.
What are the pros and cons of using grants?
There are several arguments for using grants that support
improved access to SSF. Grants are particularly well-suited to
address some of the key constraints affecting SSF recipients,
which relate to capacity and information availability rather
than a genuine lack of capital. No other type of financial
instrument can be used to provide 'software support' (such
as for training or capacity building). In addition, grants can
have a 'systemic impact' when used to improve the
conditions needed for developing an SME finance market,
such as the business climate, regulation, market information,
business support or legal frameworks. Following extensive
research in Kenya and Uganda, GIZ indicated a strong
preference for supporting the development of SSF through
these types of more general activities, without necessarily
investing in specific activities to support the SSF recipients.
A key risk when using grants, however, is that the actions that
are being supported can stop when the grant itself stops.
This might not be an issue for ex ante grants that are used to
kick-start a market, as the presumption is that the grants
would no longer be needed once the market has developed
sustainably (although developing such a market can take
time). But ex ante grants are seldom sufficient to kick-start a
market in a sustainable and scalable manner. A way of
mitigating this issue for ex post grants is to ensure that a
sustainable and predictable source of grant funding is
identified within the country itself, rather than relying on
funds from abroad.
This is particularly important given that grant funding from
bilateral donors has tended to decline (partly as a reflection
of the economic crisis and its negative effects on public
budgets in Western countries). For example, the AFD has
been phasing out grant funding to the water sector and is
now almost exclusively providing concessional loans.
To counter this potential decline in grant funding, a growing
source of grants to the sector is charitable foundations. Such
a source of funding can bring its own benefits, as described
below. The foundations that provide grant funding have
significant endowments and have shown an interest in using
innovative financing methods, such as microfinance. The
decision making process tends to be quicker for foundations
than for public agencies, which have long project approval
cycles. Therefore, grant-making foundations can be more
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flexible and responsive to market opportunities without being
bound by specific requirements in terms of the choice of
country where they work, for example. Some of the
foundations active in the sector have been using 'challenge
funds' or 'awards' mechanisms, whereby they award pre-
defined grant amounts to innovative approaches and projects
in the sector. This type of 'prize' can be very useful to
stimulate innovation and competition among small-scale
WATSAN providers. For example, the Stone Family Foundation
(based in the UK) has recently launched the 'Stone Prize for
Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Water' through which
they are looking to support new initiatives in the water sector
that are innovative, entrepreneurial and potentially scalable5.
Another type of risk associated with using grants is that they
can lead to over-reliance on subsidies and end up distorting
local markets. For example, switching from hardware
subsidies to the provision of seed funding for revolving funds
may generate confusion in the minds of recipients. As a
result, they may not necessarily consider it an 'obligation' to
repay the funds, and the latter may dwindle over the years.
Subsidising financial institutions can also distort the sizes of
the firms and create economic inefficiencies. This means that,
although grants are likely to be a critical component of any
financing strategy to support SSF for WATSAN providers,
particularly at the point of entry, they would need to be
complemented by other types of financial instruments, such
as concessional loans, guarantees or equity investments, as
detailed in the following sections.
5.2 Concessional loans
How to make the best use of concessional loans
A concessional (or 'soft') loan is one provided on concessional
lending terms, which may include lower interest rates, longer
repayment periods or a grace period. This means that the terms
of the loan are more favourable to the borrower than what they
could otherwise access in the commercial banking system.
ESAs and domestic banks (such as commercial banks or
MFIs) can offer soft loans to providers of SSF to soften the
final lending terms and facilitate access to capital for SSF
recipients. For example, a national bank in India, the National
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD),
established with a development mandate, initiated a scheme
in the late 1980s that later led to the establishment of the
'Self-help Group (SHG) Bank linkage' programme. In that
scheme, NABARD makes concessionary loans to commercial
banks that are lending to women's SHGs formed with the
support of NGOs. This model has been used to fund all sorts
of development activities including access to WATSAN (see
Boxes 11 and 15 for more details).
What are the pros and cons of using concessional
loans?
According to Latortue (2006), "Debt is the main instrument
used by international financing institutions (IFIs) to support
MFIs, comprising 74% of the funds that they deploy."
The use of concessional loans to support WATSAN SSF appears
much more limited than for microfinance as a whole. This is
probably because the market is at a very early stage of
development, which means that using grants may still be
justified. One recurrent issue with concessional loans from
ESAs is that they are usually denominated in foreign currency.
In the WATSAN sector, where all revenues are in local currency,
this exposes the borrower to a significant foreign currency risk.
This means that loans to support SSF may be provided only to
financial institutions that have the ability to carry or hedge
the risk and are sufficiently secure to repay the loans.
Lending terms may need to be further softened through the
provision of guarantees (see next section). Identifying when a
financial institution is 'ready to stand on its feet' and can
access loans rather than pure grants is often a difficult
judgment to make, which may lead to distortions (particularly
if grant support is prolonged more than necessary).
5 See http://www.thesff.com/ for more details.
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Box 11. The SHG Bank linkage programme supported by NABARD in India
The SHG Bank linkage model is supported through concessional loans from NABARD, an Apex bank created in 1981
with a mandate to facilitate credit flows for the promotion and development of agriculture, small-scale industries, and
other allied economic activities in rural areas. In this model, NABARD refinances commercial banks for the loans given
to SHGs.
SHGs are informal associations of up to 20 women (their average size is between 11 and 14) who meet regularly,
usually once a month, to save small amounts (typically INR 50 to INR 100 a month). While they are formed with the
encouragement of NGOs and other self-help promoting agencies, such as government agencies and banks, they are
expected to select their own members. They receive basic training in financial management skills and book-keeping.
After saving regularly for a minimum of six months and satisfactorily maintaining prescribed records and accounts,
they can use the funds to lend small amounts to each other for interest, which is ploughed back into the group funds.
They then become eligible to be 'linked' with the local bank branch under a NABARD-sponsored 'SHG Bank linkage
programme' (SBLP).
The SBLP, is represented in the figure below. NGOs are involved in mobilising members to form groups, providing
capacity building to members on various issues, like book-keeping, leadership and governance, and conflict
resolution within the groups. The NGOs are remunerated for the groups formed and linked with banks.
The SHG model was the first mover and all the major NGOs started forming SHGs across the country (Professional
Assistance for Development Action [PRADAN], Development of Humane Action [DHAN] Foundation, etc.). The model
was also considered to be an empowering model for women as they are expected to perform a number of activities,
like keeping books of accounts, transacting with banks for the deposit and withdrawal of money and taking loans. All
these functions were hitherto handled by men. The programme received a big push when in 2000 Andhra Pradesh
state, supported by the World Bank, started a programme to create SHGs across the state. As of March 2010, around
60 million clients were linked with banks under the SBLP.
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5.3 Guarantees
How to make the best use of guarantees
A guarantee is a contract by a third party (C) to underwrite a
financial commitment entered into by two parties (A and B). At
the national scale, guarantees can be used by national
governments to reduce the risks of borrowing and bond issues
by their sub-sovereign bodies. They can also be used by
international agencies to increase the creditworthiness of
developing country institutions. At the micro level, guarantees
can be provided by a variety of institutions (including donors)
to providers of SSF in order to improve lending terms, by
extending the maturity of the loan or reducing interest rates
(through a reduction in the associated risk premium).
The use of guarantees to support SSF, in general, is on the
rise, albeit from a fairly low base. Several IFIs and
development agencies are showing increasing interest in
using guarantees to support MFIs. For example, the USAID
Development Credit Authority had provided USD 78 million in
guarantees to microfinance by 2006 (Latortue, 2006).
Investors and donors believe that guarantees facilitate the
MFIs' access to local lenders, leverage scarce socially-
motivated financing and protect MFIs from currency risk.
However, too often guarantees seem to be poorly designed
and may end up increasing the cost of a commercial bank
loan. A Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) study
found that, "The all-in cost of a guarantee backed retail bank
loan can be more expensive for MFIs than other funding
sources: MFIs pay annual fees ranging from 0 to 4.5% of the
guarantee amount on top of the bank interest rate." Despite
these guarantee fees paid by the MFIs, the study suggested
that most guarantor institutions were not covering their costs
of providing guarantees. The CGAP study also showed that
guarantees do not, in fact, consistently lead to subsequent
direct lending by domestic banks without additional
collateral. This was the case in a number of WATSAN projects
guaranteed by donor institutions, such as in the 'gulper
project' (see Box 6), in which the DFI was reluctant to lend
over and above the guaranteed amount, thereby limiting the
leveraging effect of the guarantee.
In other cases, the use of guarantees can help leverage
private financing. Through CLIFF, jointly supported by DFID
and Sida, through Homeless International and in partnership
with the Cities Alliance, the provision of guarantees
(combined with capital and operational grants) has leveraged
significant amounts of private financing and helped scale up
the programme, as described in Box 12 below.
Box 11. The SHG Bank linkage programme supported by NABARD in India Continued...
In contrast, in the MFI model (which is explained in more detail in Box 15), the MFIs lend directly to small groups
(either joint liability groups (JLGs) or SHGs) and have to seek financing from a variety of sources, including from
commercial banks. NABARD has been providing indirect support to MFIs offering loans for sanitation through the
FINISH programme (see Box 18).
Source: Trémolet and Kumar (2012). For more information, see: http://www.nabard.org/index.asp.
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Box 12. Grants and guarantees via CLIFF
Background. The British based charity, Homeless International, with the support of DFID and Sida, started the CLIFF
programme in 2002. CLIFF is a venture capital facility which enables organisations of the urban poor to access greater
public, private and civil society sector resources. These resources are used for sustainable housing and basic services
projects for slum dwellers (including sanitation), which have the potential to be scaled up to benefit even more
people. In addition, they can be used to influence the policies and practices of banks, governments, international
development agencies and others. The programme was initially piloted in India in 2002 and later expanded to Kenya
and the Philippines.
Channelling financial resources to ultimate beneficiaries. Donors provide financing to CLIFF in the form of grants.
These grants are received by Homeless International and channelled into a revolving fund in the form of operational
and capital grants. With support from this fund, implementing partners and organisations of the urban poor (such as
the Indian Alliance organisation and the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres [SPARC], Mahila Milan and
NSDF) take out loans through local financial institutions – increasingly commercial banks such as the Bank of India or
UTI Bank (now Axis Bank). If the implementing partner lacks the collateral to take out a loan, Homeless International
provides support in the form of the guarantee provision.
In sum, CLIFF provides:
 The bulk of the funding (75%) as capital grants to enable local partners to provide loans to the projects (these 
funds are later revolved to finance new projects)
 Operational grants to cover the costs of project preparation and management
 Loan guarantees through the Homeless International guarantee fund.
Sanitation is included in CLIFF partners' projects, either indirectly as part of housing upgrade schemes (which always
include household sanitation facilities) or directly, as part of projects to build community sanitation facilities. During
Phase 1 (2002-2010), CLIFF implemented about 29 projects, of which about four had a sanitation component.
Donor support received. During the first phase of the programme (2002–2010), DFID provided about USD 11.2 million
and Sida provided about USD 4.6 million. These grants were used as seed funding for revolving funds and leveraging
commercial funding. CLIFF estimated that these donor funds leveraged about USD 87 million in commercial funding,
which gives a leverage ratio of about 5. Both DFID and Sida have raised their contributions for the second phase of
CLIFF (2010–2015), to USD 24 million and USD 6.15 million, respectively. During that second phase, CLIFF is looking
to expand the range of implementing partners and the number of countries where it is active.
Source: Trémolet and Kumar (2012).
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In Tanzania, a project supported by UN-Habitat led to the
establishment of the Tanzania Financial Services for
Underserved Settlements (TAFSUS) which identifies slum
upgrading projects, assists with project preparation and
facilitates access to finance for those projects. One of the key
tools is the provision of cash guarantees to soften lending
terms (see Box 13).
What are the pros and cons of using guarantees?
DFIs frequently ask for guarantees before extending loans to
WATSAN borrowers, largely because they are not familiar with
the sector and perceive it as risky. Although guarantees can
help with softening the lending terms, the project that is
being guaranteed needs to be financially viable, with clear
financing revenues (coming either from tariffs or predictable
taxes and transfers, in the case of a project that receives
external subsidies). The provision of guarantees, therefore,
needs to be associated with support for project preparation
and strengthening of financial management skills (as planned
in the case of the TAFSUS vehicle in Tanzania). The entities
receiving the guarantees would also need to be formally
established, in order to limit the risk to the public donor
providing the guarantee.
Box 13. Softening lending terms with guarantees: the TAFSUS example in Tanzania
TAFSUS is a Tanzanian not-for-profit company, set up in 2010, whose main aim is to raise domestic capital, provide
credit enhancement and technical assistance for the local financing of slum upgrading and affordable low-income
housing. TAFSUS is registered under the Tanzania Company Act 2002 as a company limited by guarantee. TAFSUS was
set up as a non-banking financial institution with the support of UN-Habitat (as part of their Slum Upgrading Facility
project). A number of donors were involved in setting up of the credit enhancement facility, including Sida and DFID.
TAFSUS is governed by a Board of Directors with members from the private sector, civil society, ministries and academia.
TAFSUS is mandated to work with local actors to make slum upgrading projects 'bankable' – that is, attractive to retail
banks, property developers, housing finance institutions, service providers, MFIs and utility companies. TAFSUS helps
communities to prepare project documents and negotiate with the bank. Where necessary, they can provide a guarantee
to soften lending terms. TAFSUS seeks to blend a combination of community savings, government subsidy and local
domestic commercial bank lending.
TAFSUS initially identified between 10 and 12 potential projects, with about half of them related to sanitation, including
public toilets, emptying cesspits, pit latrine construction or sewer construction. In one of the first projects considered
relative to sanitation, TAFSUS is planning to facilitate the acquisition of two gulper units (based on the model promoted
by WaterAid) by a local CBO, the Ukonga Development Trust Fund. TAFSUS is helping the CBO develop a bankable
project, provide entrepreneurship training and will provide a guarantee for the bank loan. The CBO leaders will also need
to pledge their own personal assets to guarantee the loan.
Source: Trémolet and Muruka (2012).
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5.4 Equity investments
How to make the best use of equity investments
Equity investments are a form of finance in which investors
take an 'equity stake' by purchasing shares in a given entity.
This enables them to share the risk of that entity (through
fluctuations in the share price or the risk of bankruptcy) in
return for the prospect of sharing its profits (through dividend
payments and an increase in the share price). The higher the
investment risk, the higher the expected level of return.
Equity investments are based on a more commercial
approach than other types of development aid (loans, grants,
etc.) and may be injected either into the capital of a WATSAN
service provider or that of a DFI, such as an MFI or
commercial bank. The example of the AfriCap Microfinance
Fund, funded by the EIB, although not a WATSAN example,
shows the value of equity investments to support the
development of local financial institutions.
Regarding WATSAN SSF, equity investments can be made by
ESAs and social venture funds. Given that return prospects
are unlikely to be immediate or very high, these institutions
may be willing to be involved as 'patient investors', which
means that they are not looking for market rates of return on
equity and are prepared to wait longer than private investors
for any type of return to materialise.
Equity investments are the preferred financing instrument for
some international institutions, such as the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), or social venture funds, such as the
Acumen Fund, which are increasingly looking at potential
participation in small-scale enterprises in the WATSAN sector.
Box 14. Equity investments by the AfriCap Microfinance Fund
In 2001, the EIB invested USD 1.8 million in AfriCap Microfinance Fund (AfriCap), the first commercial microfinance
equity fund dedicated to Africa. AfriCap has been very successful in investing its capital and fair value estimates of its
portfolio are showing above expectation financial returns and significant socio-economic impacts.
In 2005, AfriCap sold its shares in Equity Bank Ltd. (Kenya) to an employee fund, realising its first partial exit in favour
of local investors. This gave employees an opportunity to participate in the rapid growth of their bank and provided
appropriate commercial rewards to AfriCap and its shareholders. This exit has become a landmark and was recognised
in November 2006 when AfriCap received Africa's Venture Capital Deal of the Year award. Less than half a year later,
AfriCap had negotiated its second exit by agreeing to the sale of its shares in First Allied Savings and Loans (Ghana).
Both exits have had a powerful demonstration effect by signalling that the microfinance industry is emerging as a
commercially viable and attractive investment opportunity both for development-oriented and commercial investors.
In 2007, the EIB increased its equity investment in AfriCap by another EUR 5 million, as part of the transformation of
AfriCap into AfriCap Microfinance Investment Company.
Source: EIB (2008).
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Whereas privately-held funds had previously been examining
the WATSAN sector (such as the SNS-REAAL microfinance
fund), private sector interest has been seriously dampened
by the global financial and economic crisis which has
reduced their appetite for risky investments.
However, these funds seldom reach the smallest entrepreneurs.
This is true of all sectors and of the WATSAN sector, in particular.
According to Sanders (2006), "The IFC has invested in
approximately 100 private equity funds, which have together
funded over 1000 companies. Of these, about 500 are SMEs
with an enterprise value of below USD 4 million. 100 SMEs have
enterprise values below USD 500,000. Therefore, only 10% of
their investments target the 'missing middle' segment."
What are the pros and cons of using equity
investments?
Equity investment can foster a more commercial approach by
the recipient organisation as they need to be focused on
generating a return on investment. Equity investments can
help 'strengthen the balance sheet' of these organisations,
which means that they make them able to take on more debt
and increase their financial capacity. This is particularly
beneficial to MFIs and commercial banks extending loans to
SSF recipients, as these are likely to be increasingly
submitted to scrutiny in terms of the capital adequacy ratio.
As a result, there is a limit on how much an MFI can extend in
loans if it has limited equity. Therefore, receiving an 'equity
injection' would enable an MFI to grow its lending portfolio
whilst respecting banking regulations.
However, there are often restrictions on the ability of certain
DFIs to receive equity investments, particularly if the
institution has a charitable status. This is because 'equity
investments' are expected to generate a return and NGOs are
usually not allowed to operate for-profit. This is the case for
GUARDIAN in India, for example, which is supposed to be the
only MFI in the world that focuses specifically on offering
loans for WATSAN investments (see Box 15). A study by the
Council of Microfinance Equity Funds revealed that, "…of the
thousands of the MFIs in operation…" only 115 are legally
structured to take equity investments. The rest are, for
example, NGOs and cooperatives (Latortue, 2006).
There might also be restrictions for ESAs to take equity
participations, as these would be deemed more risky than
extending a concessional loan, for example. In those cases,
these agencies may need to rely on their 'private sector arm'
to take such participation (e.g., the IFC for the World Bank or
PROPARCO for AFD).
6. The 'channelling' challenge:
getting funds from A to B
This section examines in more detail the institutional issues
of channelling large funding packages from public funding
sources (A) to SSF recipients (B). This is particularly
challenging because of the fragmented nature of the WATSAN
market and the large number of SSF recipients that need to
be financed.
Unlike global commercial banks, donor agencies and
development banks do not have extensive retail banking
networks on which they can rely to reach the finance
recipients (such as the borrowers in the case of a loan). As a
result, such 'fund channelling' issues are not specific to the
WATSAN sector and emerge in all sectors where there is a
mismatch between the scale of the finance providers and that
of the recipients. The issue is even more complicated when
the potential finance recipients are outside of the 'formal
financial market'. Identifying the most appropriate 'financial
channelling' approach is essential to minimise transaction
costs and take pilot projects to scale.
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As Figure 3 outlines, a number of financing channels can be
used to get funds from A to B6. In this section, we examine
each of the potential financing channels, including:
 The 'straight line' approach, whereby donors/public
financiers finance DFIs and NGOs directly;
 The 'Apex approach', whereby donors identify an 
institution at the national level (also referred to as an 
Apex institution) that can disperse the funds to DFIs;
 The 'funnel approach', whereby donors provide funding to 
an institution operating in several countries (such as a 
multi-donor trust fund or MIVs) and let it allocate the 
funds based on previously agreed principles.
The 'Apex' and the 'funnel' approaches can also be combined,
when a multi-country institution (the 'funnel') decides to
channel financing via Apex institutions in each of its country of
operations.
The rest of this section gives more information about what the
alternative financing channels are and outlines the pros and
cons of using these different channels, drawing from existing
experience in the WATSAN sector as well as from other sectors.
6.1 The 'straight line approach' (through DFIs)
Some donors, particularly when they are new to SSF and want
to experiment with an approach, may choose to channel funds
directly via a specific DFI in a given country. The scale of the
programme undertaken in such a way will be driven by the
scale and geographical coverage of the selected organisation,
which in turn will determine the potential for scaling up.
There are three main types of direct local intermediaries that
can be relied upon, NGOs (which traditionally have been
favoured by donors in the WATSAN sector), MFIs and
commercial banks. The distinction between these categories
Figure 3. Alternative channels to get funds from A to B Source: Author.
6 It would be implausible for donors to channel funding directly to SSF recipients and this is, therefore, not dealt with as a realistic modus operandi here.
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is sometimes blurred as some MFIs can in fact have an NGO (or
charitable) status, whilst other MFIs evolve over time to become
full-blown commercial banks. If a donor chooses to channel
financing directly through a DFI, care should be taken to select
this local intermediary, as each institution (and each type of
institution) would have its own strengths and weaknesses.
Channelling funding through WATSAN NGOs
Many donors that have experimented with SSF for WATSAN
have chosen to channel funding through existing WATSAN
NGOs. There are advantages in this approach as such NGOs
have prior knowledge of the sector, good connections at the
local level and are genuinely motivated to increase access to
WATSAN. Some have well-established relationships with local
small businesses, to which they are able to provide technical
support for the development of locally-suitable technologies
(e.g., WaterAid played this role in the case of the gulper
project described in Box 6).
However, NGOs are not financing institutions and using them
as financial intermediaries has been part of the reason why the
performance of existing WATSAN microfinance programmes has
often been unsatisfactory. Initial seed financing for revolving
funds has been gradually depleted over time, for example, with
low repayment rates for credit schemes.
It is often difficult for an NGO to operate simultaneously as a
traditional NGO (handing out hardware subsidies or providing
software support) and as a quasi-MFI. This can create
confusion in the minds of the SSF recipients, who may think
that the 'loan' they have subscribed to does not 'really' need
to be repaid. In addition, the staff of WATSAN NGOs typically
are not trained to handle micro or mesofinance and these
organisations have no internal systems in place to assess
borrowers' credit histories or repayment capacities and
collect payments. All of these factors compounded may lead
to poor repayment rates. In addition, the type of support
services they can provide to borrowers are largely related to
their core expertise (WATSAN), but they may struggle to
impart business or financial management skills. When they
do, this is done using hired specialist firms, whose incentives
may not be closely aligned as they are not risking their own
capital in the process.
WATSAN NGOs can, nevertheless, play a very important role
in identifying the needs for financing amongst SSF recipients
and provide complementary services e.g., by conducting
behaviour change campaigns or training masons). As a result,
WATSAN NGOs can be considered as points of entry into the
sector and ongoing partners of MFIs or commercial banks. If
they want to engage in delivering microfinance, they would
need to create a separate dedicated entity, as was done in
the case of Gramalaya/GUARDIAN in India (see Box 16) or K-
Rep Bank in Kenya (see Box 17).
Channelling funding via MFIs
MFIs are organisations that provide financial services to
clients who are poorer and more vulnerable than traditional
bank clients. Most MFIs started as not-for-profit
organisations, like NGOs, credit unions and other financial
cooperatives, and state owned development and postal
savings banks. An increasing number of MFIs are now
organised as for-profit entities, often because it is a
requirement for obtaining a license from banking authorities
to offer savings (deposit taking) services.
Often there are important distinctions between MFIs
according to their legal status, as this drives their ability to
provide different types of financial services. Such legal and
regulatory provisions vary from country to country. However, a
typical distinction is between licensed and unlicensed MFIs.
Licensed MFIs are usually commercial banks, state owned
development banks and post office banks. Unlicensed MFIs
are commonly NGOs or community based MFIs that usually
have less access to commercial funding and are more likely to
need assistance to access capital. The unlicensed operators
can also include a range of cooperative models such as the
Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) and Savings and
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Box 15. The microfinance situation in India: a brief history
The different legal forms under which MFIs are registered in India are Societies, Trusts, Section 25 (not-for-profit)
companies, Non-banking Finance Companies (NBFCs), Cooperative Societies and SHG Federations. Of these, only the
NBFCs are for-profit.
Initially, most of the MFIs were registered as societies or trusts and worked as not-for-profit MFIs. As the MFIs grew, the
banks asked for more capital to secure their loans. Societies and trusts, being non-profit entities, could not raise
capital from investors who were eager to cash in on the profits available in the sector. This led to the transformation of
the large NGO-MFIs into for-profit NBFCs. The share of NBFCs in the portfolio outstanding grew from 50.5% in 2005 to
76.0% in 2009.
The transformation of the sector led to the entrance of private equity to mobilise capital. Initially, this was considered
a welcome trend by all as it helped MFIs to leverage more bank capital and in turn increase their outreach. This also
helped to drastically reduce dependence on donor funds. However, private equity also came with demands for a high
return on equity (in excess of 30%). This pushed MFIs to pursue a high growth strategy, which, essentially, was to offer
a single standardised loan product to all the clients with ever increasing loan cycles that had no connection with the
business or household cash flows of clients. The focus was no longer on building client relationships, but on just
lending and recovering the money. This led to neglect on important issues of client protection and political risk.
SKS microfinance, the biggest MFI in the country, issued an initial public offering in March 2010. It was a major
success, although many critical voices raised concerns about this commercialisation of microfinance. Soon after, in
Andhra Pradesh (the state that has the maximum penetration of microfinance in the country), a large number of cases
of inappropriate behaviour of MFI staff for loan collection surfaced and a number of suicides in the state were
attributed to the excessive pressure for repayments and usurious interest rates charged by MFIs. This led to a
clampdown on microfinance activities by the state government. Legislation was introduced that greatly restricted the
operations of MFIs in the state. The overall loan disbursements reduced significantly across the country with Andhra
Pradesh taking the maximum hit. The repayment rates also reduced drastically for MFIs with portfolios in Andhra
Pradesh, with most of the MFIs reporting only a 10 to 15% repayment rate, although the repayment rates in other
parts of the country remained unaffected.
The situation also led to a scarcity of funds for the sector as banks stopped lending to MFIs because of the overall
uncertainty of the legal status of the sector. The overall sector shrunk in size during the last quarter of fiscal year
2010/11 with all the major MFIs reporting a reduction in portfolio size.
Following this, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) set up a committee (known as the Malegam Committee) to look into the
charges of misbehaviour by MFIs and excessive interest rates. This led to the publication of a draft Microfinance 
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Box 15. The microfinance situation in India: a brief history Continued...
Regulation Bill in July 2011, in order to strengthen and harmonise the regulation of the microfinance sector in India.
The RBI guidelines, soon to be turned into law, have provided a breather to the MFI sector and a number of banks
have started lending again to MFIs. The future of the sector seems to be secure for now, though there may be some
fundamental changes in the operations of the MFIs. This demonstrates the need for regulation of the MFI industry as
for any other banking sector.
Source: Trémolet and Kumar (2012).
Loan Cooperatives (SLCs) common in Benin, Ghana or
Tanzania and the Rural/Community Banks (RCBs) in Ghana.
Licensed MFIs are usually subject to more stringent prudential
regulation and transparency requirements and are supervised
by government financial authorities. Licensing would usually
bring with it the authorisation to accept savings deposits, the
added facility to mobilise resources from domestic capital and
financial markets, the capacity to receive liquidity support from
the central bank and increased banking skills. Having access to
a deposit base means access to cheaper and more reliable
capital, and a lesser need to rely on either expensive
commercial lending or scarce donor funding. For clients, the
possibility to save in MFIs (rather than commercial banks)
means increased accessibility and reduced travel time.
In Kenya, for example, the Microfinance Act 2006 clustered
existing MFIs into three Tiers. Tier I – deposit taking
institutions. Tier II – credit only, non-deposit taking
institutions. Tier III – other organisations supervised by an
external agency (such as Rotating Savings Societies or
ROSCAs). This Act harmonised previously fragmented
legislation and enabled some MFIs to accept deposits in
exchange for increased regulation.
Another key distinction is between MFIs that have a 'for-
profit' status and those which are not-for-profit. This
distinction leads to different approaches to lending, recovery
and the associated support provided to their borrowers. In
short, some MFIs are more 'socially-minded' whereas others
are more 'commercially-orientated'. An increased commercial
focus is at the heart of what has commonly been referred to
as the 'crisis' of the Indian microfinance market, as explained
in Box 15 below. Such increased commercial focus has also
been at play in other countries, such as in Mexico, and, in
some cases, has resulted in very high lending rates and harsh
methods used for loan recovery.
Given these different types of MFIs, it is essential to survey
the market before identifying a suitable MFI to channel
funding to SSF recipients.7 Given the low level of awareness
in most MFIs of the needs of the water sector and that (in the
case of household loans) financing is not directly for income-
generating activities, but serves a broader purpose, the
'socially-minded' MFIs would typically be more receptive and
appropriate. Other MFIs may want to add this type of product
to their portfolios in order to increase their social
performances, given the increased level of emphasis coming
from the microfinance sector as a whole on evaluating social
performance (see Annex C.1.).
In many cases, such 'socially-minded' MFIs would be those
that have evolved from an NGO. For example, when Water.org,
decided to pilot projects to support microcredit for WATSAN in
7 Donors or other types of external funders who are considering channelling funding through MFIs or commercial banks can obtain information on existing actors from a 
specialised website, themixmarket.org (see Annex C.1. for more guidance on useful web-based resources).
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India, they identified an existing WATSAN NGO, Gramalaya,
operating in Tamil Nadu as the potential recipient for their
support. However, a decision was quickly taken to spin-off
GUARDIAN as a separate MFI in order to offer microfinance
services. Box 16 below reviews this experience, which is
rather unique.
Box 16. GUARDIAN, an MFI spun out of the NGO Gramalaya, Tamil Nadu, India
GUARDIAN is the first water-and-sanitation-only microfinance institution in India (and probably in the world). As such,
they have placed a strong emphasis on 'toilet loans' targeted at poor households, mostly in rural villages and some
slums. These represent the bulk of their portfolio. Although they are still relatively small, they have been rapidly
developing over the last three years and demonstrate a potential for further growth, backed by a strong operational
and financial record. During their first three years of operation, they disbursed 20,000 loans to households (60% of
which were for sanitation) which attracted a 100% repayment rate.
GUARDIAN (www.guardianmfi.org) was formally established in November 2007 by the board members of an NGO
operating in Tamil Nadu, called Gramalaya. This NGO had a long history of working in WATSAN, beginning with the
installation of hand pumps in 1986. On the sanitation side, they conduct hygiene education campaigns and have also
helped with the establishment of community-run toilet blocks, in the urban slums of Trichy, which are working
remarkably well.
Gramalaya was early in the pioneering of the WaterCredit concept with the aid of Water.org (formerly known as Water
Partners International). In March 2005, Gramalaya decided it did not want to continue with lending activities, but
preferred to maintain its status as a trust and establish a separate, but related organisation, GUARDIAN, to be in 16.
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Box 16. GUARDIAN, an MFI spun out of the NGO Gramalaya, Tamil Nadu, India Continued...
charge of micro-lending operations for WATSAN. Some of Gramalaya's board members and long-standing staff were
deputed to create GUARDIAN, bringing with them technical expertise in the WATSAN sector.
GUARDIAN was registered as a Section 25 company under the Indian Companies Act 1956, which means that it is a
not-for-profit MFI. As such, it is able to borrow directly from commercial banks (something that Gramalaya, as a charity,
is not able to do). GUARDIAN uses the MFI model, which was developed in India based on the experience of the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. In this model, represented in the Figure below, MFIs borrow from commercial banks
to on-lend directly to SHGs or JLGs. JLGs are made up of fewer members (up to five members) than SHGs and are
formed solely for the purpose of taking out a loan. Neither SHGs nor JLGs require collateral. Instead, the group lending
model substitutes for the need for collateral by requiring that if one of the members of the SHG or JLG defaults on a
payment, the rest of the group will pay on his/her behalf.
To date, GUARDIAN has received commercial loans from the local branch of the Indian Overseas Bank (IOB) for a total
of approximately USD 1.6 million. Other banks have not been willing to fund them as they deemed GUARDIAN's rating
insufficient. Gramalaya also provided GUARDIAN with a guarantee, which means that if they default on a loan to IOB,
the amount will be taken from Gramalaya without affecting GUARDIAN's borrowers.
GUARDIAN received initial grant support from Water.org, an NGO based in the USA that focuses on supporting WATSAN
through its WaterCredit initiative, for a total of approximately USD 165,000. Until May 2011, GUARDIAN received grant
support for its operational costs (predominantly salaries and administration expenses) from Water.org. Grant support
also covered the costs of the technical and institutional support provided by BASIX IGS (Indian Grameen Services), the
Institutional Development Services branch of a leading Indian MFI based in Hyderabad, as well as from ASA, based in
Bangladesh. Support from BASIX IGS was provided over the course of six months and covered activities such as initial
training, research, product design and development, preparation of operational policies and definition of collection
systems. The MFI is now able to stand on its own feet and operational grants have been phased out.
Each USD 1 invested by Water.org in GUARDIAN's activities leveraged approximately USD 16 in commercial funding
(including so-called 'patient capital' from social investors, such as the Acumen Fund and Milaap). GUARDIAN has more
recently approached social investors in an attempt to diversify their funding sources. They have also obtained funding
from Milaap (a small NGO based in Bangalore which functions on the Kiva model) and the Acumen Fund, which
invests in social enterprises throughout the world and is willing to accept lower (and slower) returns on its investment
than private investors.
Source: Trémolet and Kumar (2012).
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MFIs can act as useful financial intermediaries as they would
typically have strong networks at the local level and know
their customer base well. For microfinance, the group lending
mechanism allows reducing or waiving collateral
requirements. Compared with NGOs, they would have already
established systems for assessing repayment capacity and
collecting revenues, with a network of credit officers who are
accustomed to extend financing for a variety of purposes and
are incentivised to collect their dues. However, many MFIs
may lack the business skills to assess larger projects
associated with mesofinance. Compared with the fast and
standardised operations for microfinance, SME financing
requires higher transaction costs per client. The capacity to
take on this type of transaction may be higher, at the level of
commercial banks, as described below.
Channelling funds through a local commercial bank
Commercial banks are financial institutions that provide
banking services, such as accepting deposits and providing
credit facilities and loans. They differ from retail banks as they
execute transactions not only with individuals, but also with
small businesses and corporations. Commercial banking
activities also differ from investment banking activities, which
include underwriting, facilitating mergers, etc. Commercial
banks are usually not supported by donors and are
accountable to their shareholders for the profits they make.
Commercial banks that operate in micro and mesofinance can
either come 'from above' or 'from below'. As the microfinance
sector has grown substantially over the last decade, many
'traditional' commercial banks have diversified their services
to enter this segment of the market, such as Citigroup, for
example. At the other end of the spectrum, former non-profit
NGOs or MFIs may have made the transition towards
becoming profit-making entities whilst remaining in the
business of microfinance lending. This has been the case of
K-Rep Bank, a leading provider of microfinance services in
Kenya, as described in Box 17 below.
Commercial banks can be an appropriate channel for
microfinance (particularly in urban and peri-urban areas) or
mesofinance/SME loans. Large commercial banks may have
better access to capital than small MFIs and a stronger
network of bank specialists. In order to keep their corporate
risk profiles to acceptable levels, commercial banks may
choose to co-finance small businesses and share risks with a
second party. However, some commercial banks may have
minimum loan sizes (in order to reduce transaction costs),
meaning that their participation would be more forthcoming
in larger projects, possibly following a first round financed 
by MFIs.
Overall assessment
When selecting a single institution at the domestic level,
experience has shown that it is preferable to channel
funding through an established financial institution
(preferably a 'socially-minded' MFI with an extensive retail
network and a substantial customer base) rather than
through a WATSAN NGO. This is because it is more difficult
(and therefore costly) to 'transform' a sector NGO into a
financial institution than to help an existing financial
institution develop specialised products for WATSAN
investments. Going through a commercial bank may be the
favoured route for larger projects involving mesofinance.
However, it might lead to unattractive lending terms for the
borrowers, unless this commercial bank is 'socially-minded'
and the cost of borrowing can be lowered (through the
provision of guarantees, for example).
6.2 The 'Apex approach'
For international donors, the plethora of MFIs and 
commercial banks that exist can be an inhibitor in deciding
who to fund. As a result, donor institutions often rely on
financial intermediaries in the form of Apex institutions to
channel funds to DFIs, who will then on-lend to small-scale
agents, including in the WATSAN sector.
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Box 17. Moving from CBO to commercial bank status: K-Rep Bank in Kenya
Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme (K-Rep) was founded as a CBO in 1984 to support the development of small and
micro enterprises in Nairobi. It was a project of the US based NGO World Education Incorporated. Its banking arm has
since become a successful, commercial, microfinance bank. Despite its transition to commercial status, it works to
balance its social and profit-orientated mission by maintaining a focus on the provision of financial services to the
poor. As of 2010, K-Rep Bank had 65,000 borrowers and 170,000 depositors with a portfolio of USD 61 million and
customer deposits worth almost USD 67 million.
In 1987, the project was incorporated as a local NGO. In 1989, it changed its original strategy of supporting NGOs with
grants and technical assistance to that of providing them with loans. In the same year, K-Rep established a microcredit
lending programme as its core business and growth area. It also expanded activities to include research and product
development and changed its technical assistance (TA) activities to a for-a-fee capacity building service. In 1999, K-
Rep's microcredit section was converted into a commercial microfinance bank. Two other entities were established,
including K-Rep Development Agency (to carry on R&D work) and K-Rep Advisory Services (to serve as a consulting
company).
As a microfinance institution, K-Rep Bank provides loans, savings and banking services with the objective of building
up the assets of low-income groups and individuals in shelter, health and education. K-Rep Bank took an early lead in
financing water services in Kenya following their involvement with the Kenya Microfinance for Water Projects Activity
(see Box 9). In parallel with that project, the microcredit department has been providing small loans to its clients to
purchase water tanks for rain water harvesting and water storage (see Box 4).
The water project is an anchor programme within its health mission and, more importantly, a frontier financial product
managed by the Special Projects Department. It is recognised within the Bank as generating other financial services
that add value to the bank's target clients, by giving access to cash deposit services to customers of water service
providers, water services boards and government grant agencies. It was reported that deposits received from water-
related customers was about KES 18 million (USD 225,000) during the Microfinance for Water Projects Activity. In
addition, the bank has also extended services to farmers in the area of the project for the financing of dairy cows and
other farm inputs.
Source: Muruka and Mugweru (2012).
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Box 18. ARB Apex Bank Limited, Ghana
The ARB Apex Bank Limited of Ghana started operating in 2002. Its shareholders are the Rural/Community Banks.
There are a total of 136 rural banks throughout Ghana with 700 branches in total. The first rural banks in Ghana were
set up in the late 1970s, although many of them have taken time to get established. These banks are owned by local
people and can only operate within a radius of 40 kilometres around their headquarters.
They offer a broad range of financial services and can take deposits (they can only lend up to 57% of their deposit
amounts). They offer loans for income generation (trading, agriculture, cottage industries) and also for housing, school
fees or home improvement. Their mission is to encourage local development.
The mission of the ARB Apex Bank is to provide banking as well as non-banking support services to the Rural/Community
Banks to help them improve their operational efficiency, and thereby, transform them into efficient and credible financial
institutions, which can effectively address the banking needs of the communities in which they operate.
The ARB Apex Bank functions as a 'mini' central bank for the Rural/Community Banks under the supervision of the
Bank of Ghana. ARB Apex Bank has outlets in all the 10 regional capitals. The Apex Bank ensures effective supervision
of Rural/Community Banks with regular regulatory inspections, to insure that internal control measures and good
book-keeping practices are observed. It also provides services such as cheque clearing, fund management, technical
support, joint product development and training. Although such rural banks have yet to provide financing for WATSAN
investments, the ARB Apex Bank has expressed strong interest in developing this type of product in the context of a
WATSAN programme funded by EIB/AFD in small towns and rural areas.
For more information, see: http://www.arbapexbank.com/abtapex.htm
What is an Apex institution?
An Apex institution is an institutional mechanism operating
within a single country or integrated market to channel funds,
with or without TA or other supporting services, to a
significant number of retail MFIs that, in turn, disburse loans
to low-income people. Apex institutions are usually funded
with public money, but they take various institutional forms,
such as development banks, NGOs, donor programmes,
private commercial banks and special government or donor
programmes. They may otherwise be known as second tier
banks or national funds. Apex institutions permit donors to
pass the difficult and time-consuming task of MFI selection to
a local institution that has the requisite skills and is deemed
politically independent. Funding is redistributed to MFIs as
concessional loans (or more rarely, grants) with or without TA
for improving operations.
CGAP 2010 identified 76 Apex institutions in operation
around the world. They found that Apex institutions are
especially prevalent in Latin America and south Asia (69%
and 29% respectively of the total Apex disbursements in
2007). The number of Apex institutions in Africa has grown in
recent years, with eight Apex institutions being created
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Box 19. The FINISH programme in India: channelling funding to MFIs for 'toilet loans'
The FINISH programme was set up as a five year programme in 2008. Its main objective is to expand sanitation
infrastructure to rural India to cover 1 million households by 2013. They intend to do this not just through the building
of toilets, but by promoting an overall 'sanitation system' that takes a holistic look at the process. There is a strong
emphasis on hygiene promotion and awareness-raising through to the safe treatment and disposal of excreta. As of
July 2011, FINISH had contributed to the extension of 132,000 'toilet loans' throughout seven Indian states, with the
highest number being provided by BISWA in Orissa.
FINISH functions as a partnership between seven organisations that each brings very different expertise. It was
initiated by SNS-REAAL (a Dutch Bank) and BISWA (an Indian NGO and MFI), with others joining later, including TATA-
AIG (an Indian insurance company), WASTE (a Dutch NGO specialised in sanitation and solid waste), NABARD, the
National Housing Bank and the United Nations University.
On the ground, FINISH works through about eight implementing partners who are based in seven states around India.
These are well-established NGOs/MFIs with prior experience in microfinance and sanitation, who are willing to commit
10% of their microfinance portfolio for work in sanitation. The organisations that were selected mainly operate in rural
areas because this is where sanitation coverage is lowest (in some rural areas, it is as low as 5% although average
coverage is around 25%).
Given that FINISH operates with a number of different NGO partners, the terms of the loan products on offer vary
according to the capacity of each MFI/NGO. For example, BISWA gives smaller loans of INR 4000 (USD 80) over one
year with an interest rate of 20% reducing to 10%. In contrast, BWDC gives larger loans of up to INR 350,000 (USD
7000) for a package of a septic tank, latrine and bathroom.
Once it has selected its implementing partners, FINISH provides them with small grants and technical support for
awareness-raising. For awareness-raising, they have included some aspects of CLTS and have also made their own
media to promote sanitation.
Their strategy is to achieve 100% sanitation coverage in a few villages before moving to the next ones. One innovative
aspect of the programme is the provision of incentive payments to MFIs and their credit officers to improve sanitation
coverage. Achieving total sanitation in a village can be a difficult task because the coverage lingers at relatively high
levels and never reaches 100%. In order to achieve full coverage, FINISH grants incentive payments to MFI staff, as
they play the joint roles of animators and loan officers. Through the MFIs, FINISH channels INR 600 per month (USD
12) to staff members, which is raised to INR 1200 per month (USD 24) once their initial target is reached. In addition
to this, the organisations are granted INR 75 (USD 1.5) for each toilet built using a loan which exceeds the 50%
coverage target. This is raised to INR 150 (USD 3) when the village coverage reaches 70% and is then raised again at
Box 19. The FINISH programme in India: channelling funding to MFIs for 'toilet loans' Continued...
90% coverage. This incentive payment is paid by FINISH to the relevant partner organisation. In some cases, these
organisations will chose to share it with their field workers and in others, to add it to the revenue of the organisation
as a whole. Currently, 41% of the total FINISH budget has been earmarked for incentive payments (referred to as
'output-based aid').
FINISH is financed only partly from donor grants, the vast majority of the funds (90%) are leveraged from commercial
banks. The grant portion of the programme, estimated at about 9% of the total funding, has been provided by DGIS of
the Netherlands.
Source: Trémolet and Kumar (2012); http://www.finishsociety.com/.
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between 2003 and 2008. In 2008/2009, Apex institutions
disbursed approximately USD 2 billion of public money to MFIs,
which is almost as much as the total disbursements by donors
and investors to the entire microfinance sector in 2007. A
majority of Apex institutions are funded both by international
donors and domestic governments. CGAP 2010 found that the
top five international funders of Apex institutions are KfW, the
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
International Fund for Agricultural Development and the EU.
Examples of established institutions serving as Apex
institutions include La Financiera de Desarrollo Territorial S.A.
(FINDETER) in Colombia (an Apex institution established in
1989 to facilitate access to commercial bank financing for local
governments in Colombia)8, NABARD in India (the largest Apex
institution in the world, described in Box 11) or the ARB Apex
Bank Limited in Ghana (see Box 18). Most existing Apex
institution funds were established in the 1990s and 2000s.
The role of Apex agencies vary from country to country, as
they can be used to channel funds, but they would also offer
a variety of financial and support services to the DFIs with
which they interact. As these institutions tend to operate at a
multi-sector level, their degree of familiarity with the WATSAN
sector also varies quite substantially. For example, 25% of
the loans to municipal governments and local corporations
facilitated by FINDETER were for WATSAN investments. The
ARB Apex Bank in Ghana has indicated a strong interest in
supporting rural banks to develop WATSAN lending products.
In addition, specially established programmes, such as
FINISH, can be used as an Apex-type channel for funding. This
type of approach allows much more targeted support to MFIs
and commercial banks looking to extend SSF services to
WATSAN. The FINISH project combines a mix of incentives and
support services that makes it innovative and scalable to
other parts of India and with potential for other countries.
The pros and cons of channelling funding through an
Apex institution
Throughout the microfinance sector, donors are increasingly
choosing to channel funding through Apex institutions. They
have often been used as a funding channel of choice to keep
MFIs going in Cambodia, Malaysia and India following the
global financial crisis (CGAP 2010).
There are many good reasons for international donors and
domestic governments to channel public funding through Apex
institutions which can explain their popularity. Apex
8 See OECD (2010) for more information.
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institutions can serve as useful intermediaries for donors,
investors and governments because they cut down on
transaction costs. They take on the responsibility for 
selecting MFIs and channelling funds to them in a context
where there are too many for donors to choose from and the
transaction costs (and associated risks) of selecting MFIs can
be very high. As a result, they can be a useful channel for
large amounts of finance. They can assist donor coordination
through centralisation and thereby help to shield MFIs from
donor pressures and diversity of standards, reporting
requirements, etc. They can also be a coordinating body
for MFIs.
Levy (2002) argued that Apex institutions are better informed
than governments or international donors and are, therefore,
in "…a much stronger position … to select the best potential
candidate for viability and to provide the necessary hands-on
guidance and supervision." They can provide TA at a lower
cost than individual MFIs. Apex institutions can also take on
other functions beyond loans, such as acting as guarantors
for MFIs, although many Apex institutions would not
necessarily be able to extend guarantees. Such instruments
enable MFIs to gradually access national and international
financial and capital markets and build bridges between MFIs
and commercial, retail systems. As specialised institutions,
they can provide an oversight function on sound
microfinance, although this can sometimes generate a
conflict of interest with their lending and TA activities.
Apex institutions are also able to provide funding in local
currency as opposed to international investors who offer two-
thirds of their debt in a hard currency and expose the
borrower to international exchange risks.
The fact that they are useful from a donors' perspective
means that Apex institutions can often be created as a result
of funding supply rather than demand. As a result, they may
end up as storing facilities for unused donor money. Although
they are supposed to be useful organisations for selecting
MFIs to fund, some Apex institutions do not have the
necessary expertise to perform such selection or risk being
subject to political pressure in doing so.
Apex institutions can be hard to reach on the MFI side,
however, because their procedures can be as complicated as
those of the donors. In sectors where MFIs are too small and
unable to use Apex funds appropriately, funding should be
focused on building up MFIs institutionally through grants,
rather than on creating intermediaries. For example, K-Rep
tried to start off as an Apex institution, but in the end opted
to be a stand-alone microfinance retailer because there was
not a sufficient nucleus of viable MFIs for them to support
(Levy, 2002). In cases where there are stronger MFIs in
existence, Apex institutions can crowd out commercial
funding for those strong MFIs who no longer need to be
reliant on them. Given that Apex institutions are often lending
at below market rate terms, they may weaken the incentives
for the sector as a whole to reach sustainable financing.
Overall, Apex institutions can provide a very useful financial
channel for donors to transfer substantial amounts of funding
to MFI-type institutions in developing countries. Their ability
to play a useful role varies substantially from country to
country and some countries may not have viable Apex
institutions in place. In the latter cases, donors may need to
start by supporting the establishment of a sound Apex
institution.
In addition, given that most Apex institutions are generalist
financial institutions, they would usually be unaware of the
specific needs of the WATSAN sector. Donors looking to
support micro and mesofinance for WATSAN would, therefore,
need to build the awareness of Apex institutions and use
them to develop financial products that meet those needs.
6.3 The 'funnel approach' 
As an alternative or complement to the previous models,
donors may look at channelling funding through an
intermediary active in multiple countries, which would, 
in turn, look to transfer funds through domestic Apex
institutions directly to MFIs or even directly to SSF recipients.
Various types of intermediaries can be considered for these
purposes, including international NGOs, multi-donor trust
funds, or finally, MIVs, which are commonly used in the
microfinance sector to channel both public and private funds.
The following sections examine each of these potential
intermediaries in turn.
International NGOs
International NGOs can serve as intermediaries for ESAs in
order to channel funding. For example, the Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs stated in their response to the survey
conducted for this study that 25% of their total overseas
development assistance flows are channelled through NGOs.
They indicated their extensive experience in providing
funding for micro and mesofinance, in general, and to
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Box 20. The WaterCredit initiative
As part of a diverse portfolio of WATSAN activities, Water.org started a microcredit programme for WATSAN in
Bangladesh in 2003. They saw this as a way of leveraging additional sources of finance, over and above the limited
amounts of donor funding. They then expanded to South India in 2004 and to Kenya in 2005. In each country, they
entered into partnerships with local MFIs and supporting organisations, including for example Dushtha Shasthya
Kendra in Bangladesh, BASIX, Gramalaya and GUARDIAN in India, and Equity Bank and KWFT in Kenya.
The WaterCredit model has evolved over time. Early on, Water.org would provide seed financing for a revolving loan
programme. They would make a grant to the partner NGO at the national level which was intended to cover all costs,
i.e. the costs of product development as well as seed financing for the revolving loan programme. The main limitation
of this model was that it could only provide limited funding, which naturally reduced the degree of scale possible.
Water.org also pursued partnerships with MFIs and found that this model worked well. In the MFI-led model, Water.org
does not provide financing for the loans themselves, but rather provides assistance to the MFI to develop financial
products suitable for the WATSAN needs of their clients. Each MFI is responsible for mobilising loan capital through
existing channels (e.g. internal savings, commercial banks and social investors). This is the model that they have used
to support the establishment and subsequent operations of GUARDIAN in Tamil Nadu, South India (see Box 16).
This approach has enabled them to implement much larger programmes. The WaterCredit network now includes 23
partners. The latest programme in India, with the support of the PepsiCo Foundation, had a total budget of USD 8
million of grant funding, which is expected to mobilise an additional USD 26 million in commercial and social
investments and USD 1 million of in-kind and community contributions.
Overall, Water.org estimates that, "…after 10 years of loan cycles, five times as many people have water with
WaterCredit than with a similar amount of grant funding." Since 2007, the global WaterCredit repayment rate by
partner MFIs has been between 97 and 98%.
Source: Trémolet (2011).
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Box 21. REGMIFA – Regional MSME Investment Fund for sub-Saharan Africa
REGMIFA is a debt fund which focuses on refinancing regulated and/or non-regulated MFIs, local commercial banks
and/or other financial institutions (referred to as partner lending institutions or PLIs) that are established in sub-
Saharan African countries and provide funding to MSMEs. It provides its partner lending institutions with longer-term
senior loans, subordinated debt and guarantee schemes, the majority of which are in local currency.
REGMIFA was created as an initiative arising from the G8 summit that took place in Germany in 2007. The G8 endorsed
the idea of establishing an investment fund for the promotion of MSMEs in the sub-Saharan region. KfW, supported by
the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, took the lead in developing this initiative in close
collaboration with a group of 10 other development finance institutions from Spain, Belgium, Austria, France, and
Norway as well as the EIB and the IFC.
REGMIFA was launched in May 2010 and is based in Luxemburg. Its mission is to build a unique PPP between donors,
development finance institutions, private investors and African stakeholders to provide financing to qualified and PLIs
serving MSMEs. In pursuing its development goal, the Fund observes the principles of sustainability and additionality,
combining public mandate and market orientation.
REGMIFA has a unique capital structure (with three types of shares available to investors, each with its own risk
structure) which embodies the principle of PPP through the leveraging of public funds as a risk cushion to attract
significant private sector capital to sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the investment fund, a dedicated TA facility
focuses on practical implementation assistance to client institutions and on capacity building.
Source: http://www.regmifa.com/presentation/strategy
WATSAN, in particular. This they always do through partner
organisations (e.g., by establishing revolving funds). In the
WATSAN sector, they have a long-standing relationship with
BRAC in Bangladesh and are also the main funders of the
FINISH partnership, developed with the support of WASTE, a
Dutch NGO with expertise in designing WATSAN programmes
using micro and mesofinance (see Box 20).
International NGOs are also used extensively by foundations
(such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Michael
and Susan Dell Foundation and the PepsiCo Foundation) for
channelling funding to MFIs. For example, the PepsiCo
Foundation has channelled funding through Water.org, the
only WATSAN NGO that has developed a specific initiative,
WaterCredit, expressly focused on supporting MFIs to develop
their WATSAN lending activities.
Channelling funding through an international NGO or charity
can be attractive as many international donors have already
established links with such organisations. However, still
relatively few existing international NGOs have extensive
successful experience with running microfinance and
mesofinance schemes for WATSAN. There would, therefore,
be a need to build their expertise in this area, develop and
pilot-test successful models before channelling substantial
amounts of funding for these purposes. Many NGOs with
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good credentials in WATSAN lack financing expertise, whilst
international NGOs involved in microfinance have limited
knowledge of the water sector. A few, such as CARE, have
tried to combine both based on their experience with village
savings and loans schemes.
Multi-donor trust funds
Another channel at the international level consists of multi-
donor trust funds. Many respondents to the survey of EU
donors referred to the WSP or the GPOBA as their channels of
choice for reaching WATSAN SSF recipients. For example, WSP
is currently running a multi-year programme supporting the
development of the domestic private sector. This organisation
can be used to fund the soft side of facilitation support as
well as ex post subsidies (such as output-based subsidies to
service providers in the case of GPOBA).
However, such funds are usually not specialised in micro or
mesofinance nor focused on WATSAN, but have other
objectives. As a result, they would themselves need to
identify either international or domestic intermediaries in
order to provide funding to WATSAN SSF recipients (e.g.,
channelling funding to local MFIs).
Microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs)
MIVs are private entities which act as intermediaries between
investors and MFIs. MIVs receive investments generally from
IFIs by issuing shares, units, bonds, grants, equity
investments or other financial instruments. These resources
are then pooled and sometimes blended to provide efficient
and targeted financial support to MFIs, such as debt, equity
or guarantees (not grants, in general, as such MIVs are
commercial investment vehicles). The diversity of MIVs (self-
managed or not, profit seeking or not, investing in individual
MFIs or in other MIVs) makes it possible for many different
types of investors to become involved in the SSF sector. As
for the recipients of their funding, they range from direct
investment in individual MFIs to investments in other MIVs.
According to Latortue (2006), Profund, created in 1995, was
the first microfinance investment fund. It was joined in the
following years by a handful of others, such as Dexia,
Oikokredit and Unitus. The number of such funds rose to 60
in 2006, with the creation of many such MIVs being
supported by international donors. The total amount of funds
that they manage stood at USD 1.5 billion in 2006 and has
been growing over the last few years.
MIVs operate at the international level across different
countries. They make use of different currencies and are
profit seeking, although with varying expectations in terms of
their return on investment. In this role as an intermediary
investment vehicle, MIVs are growing rapidly in nearly every
aspect including total assets, assets devoted strictly to
microfinance, and regional funding. MIVs differ from Apex
institutions in a variety of ways. MIVs are a means of pooling
finance flows from various types of investors who are looking
to invest in microfinance, but are not set on a specific country.
In contrast, Apex institutions are on the receiving end of
financial flows; they do not provide finance directly, but instead
channel the funds they receive to MFIs in a given country.
Depending on the type of MIV, the investments they provide
to MFIs can be as debt, equity or guarantees. An example of
an MIV recently set up with European donor support is
REGMIFA, a regional investment fund supporting the
development of micro, small and medium enterprises
(MSMEs) in sub-Saharan Africa. Although it could act as a
very useful channel for mesofinance to WATSAN
entrepreneurs, it has yet to be used for this purpose.
Overall assessment
Even though some of the financial channels presented above
are not currently much in use in the WATSAN sector (such as
MIVs), their use could be expanded in the context of an
expansion of the financial offerings to the WATSAN sector.
Such development is likely to require initiatives at the level of
individual ESAs as well as concerted actions.
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Annex A. Overview of the SSF
market in Kenya
A supporting study was carried out in order to understand the
extent to which local financial institutions provide financing
to small-scale WATSAN providers in the specific case of
Kenya. This study updates and expands on and an earlier
study conducted for GIZ in 2007 (Biesinger and Ritcher,
2007) which examined similar issues.
Using largely a qualitative research approach, MicroSave
Consulting Ltd (based in Nairobi), identified and surveyed
financial institutions including MFIs and commercial banks
actively involved in financing the WATSAN sector. The full
study contains the following components:
 An overview of the WATSAN sector in Kenya;
 An analysis of what financial services DFIs provide to the 
WATSAN sector and how such services fit in the broader 
range of products the financial institutions offer to their 
customers;
 An analysis of the extent to which donor support might be 
required in order to encourage these financing institutions
to offer their services to WATSAN SSF recipients.
The WATSAN situation in Kenya
With a population of 48.6 million people, the majority of
which live in rural areas, Kenya faces challenges to meet the
MDGs with regard to access to clean water and improved
sanitation. In 2007, approximately 62% of Kenyans had
access to water; compared to the less than one-half (48%)
who had access to improved sanitation services.
As Kenya is a water scarce country, there is a need for an
effective water management regime, hence the enactment of
the Water Act 2002 which provides for regulation and
management of water and sewerage service provision. The
regulatory regime has encouraged the participation of small
water service companies and community based water groups.
It is estimated that 60% of the population in Nairobi (the
majority living in unplanned settlements) relies on water
services from small-scale providers (Mehta et al., 2007).
Overall, in excess of 77% of the households in the country
rely on streams or water from boreholes. UNICEF
(WHO/UNICEF, 2008) estimated that a total of 16 million
Kenyans used unimproved water sources.
Financial services in Kenya: development and outreach
Kenya has a fairly vibrant financial sector. Kenya is
considered to be the financial hub of the east and central
Africa region, with a stable banking sector (43 banks and one
mortgage company) and a long history of SACCOs, MFIs and
informal savings mechanisms. In the last decade, the
government has made concerted efforts to attract
investments through tourism promotion, tight banking
regulations (e.g. gradual increase of capital requirements)
and privatisation of public enterprises e.g. sale of public
shares in the telecommunications and energy parastatals.
However, access to formal financial services remains low. A
study by the Financial Sector Deepening Trust, supported by
DFID, showed that only about 40.5% of the adult population
has access to formal financial services in Kenya. Access to
financial services has been on the rise, however, with rapid
expansion of a bank branch network, improved regulation of
MFIs and provision of services through mobile phones. This is
especially true of the M-PESA money transfer services offered
by Safaricom – a mobile telephone service provider partially
owned by the Vodafone group, which has grown extremely
fast in recent years.
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Financial institutions and products on offer to the
WATSAN market
There is a disproportionate emphasis on financing water
services as opposed to sanitation in Kenya. The study found
that financial institutions have developed financial products
for water both for individual customers and community based
groups. The financial institutions interviewed for this study
offer small loans for water-related enterprises and irrigated
agriculture. Few financial institutions had specific financial
products targeting the sanitation sector, however. It appears
that financial institutions find it easier to provide financing for
water-related assets compared to sanitation. In addition,
there are many donor funded projects, for example, Kenya
Water and Health Organisation, focusing on water which
financial institutions can partner with to deliver services.
MFIs are offering small loans for plastic water tanks. Pioneering
MFIs in this segment included Faulu Kenya DTM Ltd, Kenya
Women DTM Ltd, SMEP DTM Ltd and ECLOF Kenya, among
others. Nowadays, commercial banks focusing on low-income
households, including Equity Bank, Family Bank and K-Rep
Bank, also provide small loans to their customers to purchase
water tanks. The water tanks are generally used to harvest rain
water and/or water storage for those accessing piped water.
The financial institutions facilitate access to these tanks in
partnership with tank manufacturers and/or distributors. Since
the financial institutions provide an opportunity for bulk
purchase, water tank manufacturers offer as much as 40%
discount to financial institution customers.
The second financial product on offer in the market is project
finance. Financial institutions finance individual or
community based WATSAN projects. While the main financial
institutions in Kenya offer project financing in some form, few
offer project financing to WATSAN projects. In the K-Rep Bank,
water projects, and in the Family Bank, sanitation projects
are managed under special project departments. In the Equity
Bank, water-related projects are financed across a range of
different products, for example, asset finance to purchase
trucks or agriculture financing to purchase irrigation
equipment. There is a perceived need to mainstream such
special projects into the overall activities of the financial
institutions, as many of these types of financing were initially
developed as pilot projects.
Overall, the financial institutions interviewed indicated that
they provide financial products for WATSAN in some form.
However, these are spread across different products and the
financial institutions do not particularly monitor the size of
their WATSAN portfolio. Going forward, it would be important
to support financial institutions to separate out and monitor
their interventions in the WATSAN sector. Such support could
help financial institutions with their product development
and marketing activities, in order to measure the performance
of the WATSAN portfolio, collect client feedback and assess
the outcomes of interventions to facilitate the country's
progress toward meeting the MDG targets.
Key WATSAN financing programmes in Kenya
The study identified two key financial institutions involved in
WATSAN projects.
K-Rep Bank Ltd has developed a financing model in
partnership with GPOBA and WSP. The K-Rep Bank model
pilots and demonstrates the viability of leveraging
microfinance to improve access to a water supply for low-
income people in Kenya. The project involves the
identification of CWPs and financing of up to 80% of the cost
of infrastructure development following a market driven
project assessment and lending appraisal process. The model
includes an output-based subsidy arrangement whereby up
to 40% of the loan amount is paid to the project upon
meeting specific targets. The subsidy component seeks to
increase the sustainability of the community managed water
supply project. The subsidy is used to offset part of the loan.
Starting with an initial US 1.1 million for the pilot, the bank
has since committed USD 4 million to scale up the project
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nationwide to meet increasing demand, as confirmed by more
than 19 unsolicited project proposals from community based
water projects across Kenya.
On a smaller scale, Family Bank Ltd, in partnership with
Practical Action, is implementing a project in one district to
provide loans to owners of rented houses to improve toilets
and solid waste management.
Status and role of donor support to financial
institutions
Few financial institutions interviewed indicated that they
received any donor support to extend financial services to the
WATSAN sector. Where such support was provided, for
example, in the cases of K-Rep Bank and Family Bank, the
financial institutions viewed these as special projects or pilots.
Donor organisations do not seem to show a particular
preference for supporting the financial institutions to expand
services to the WATSAN sector. The donor organisations have
used a mix of approaches, including a combination of grants
and guarantee schemes in the case of the K-Rep Bank/GPOBA
project, a guarantee scheme in the case of the Family
Bank/Practical Action project and capital grants and
guarantees in the case of Homeless International and the
CLIFF projects.
It is clear that for projects that have received some donor
support, this has contributed to expanding their outreach by
designing the project as community based. This seems to
have a better potential to reach many households as
compared to small loans provided to individual clients by
MFIs and microfinance banks, especially for water tanks.
Donor support is clearly very important for MFIs and
microfinance banks to scale up financing to the WATSAN
sector.
Donor support is needed for market development and
improvement of the financial institutions' capacities to
engage with the water sector actors. MFIs have tight cash
flows hence they need to access loan funds to expand their
operations in the WATSAN sectors. Banks, on the other hand,
do have capital, but need to manage risks related to lending
to new market segments; hence the need for guarantees and
appropriate collateral arrangements with borrowers.
While the K-Rep Bank–GPOBA project has demonstrated the
viability of leveraging mesofinance to finance water service
infrastructure, it remains unclear how the model may be used
in promoting improved sanitation services in Kenya.
Nonetheless, the project is an important example that both
financial institutions and donors can learn from. Donors
should be encouraged to establish such inclusive
partnerships to improve funding to the WATSAN sector.
Annex B. Glossary: financial
terms relative to SSF
The companion EUWI-FWG publication Financing for Water
and Sanitation: a Primer for Practitioners and Students in
Developing Countries includes an extensive glossary of
financial terms. The glossary below complements this and
focuses on terms particularly relevant to small-scale
financing.
Angel investors. Angel investors are individuals who invest in
businesses looking for a higher return than they would expect
from more traditional investments. Many are successful
entrepreneurs who want to help other entrepreneurs get their
businesses off the ground. Usually they provide a bridge
between the self-funded stage of the business to the point
where the business needs a level of funding that a venture
capitalist would offer.
Apex institution. An Apex institution is an institutional
mechanism operating within a single country or integrated
market to channel funds, with or without TA or other
supporting services, to a significant number of retail MFIs
that, in turn, disburse loans to low-income people. Apex
institutions are usually funded with public money, but they
take various institutional forms, such as development banks,
NGOs, donor programmes, private commercial banks and
special government or donor programmes. They may
otherwise be known as second tier banks or national funds.
Apex institutions permit donors to pass the difficult and time-
consuming task of MFI selection to a local institution that is
assumed to have the requisite skills and to be politically
independent. Funding is redistributed to MFIs with or without
TA for improving operations.
Blending finance. Blending grant and loan financing is often
useful to soften the overall terms of a financing package. This
financial mechanism can make water infrastructure projects
with a delayed or drawn-out financial return more viable. A
number of blending platforms exist in which grant and loan
funds from various sources can be combined.
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR). The ratio of a bank's capital to
its risk. National regulators track a bank's CAR to ensure that
it can absorb a reasonable amount of loss and complies with
statutory capital requirements.
Collateral. Collateral refers to any type of assets pledged by a
borrower that may be seized by the lender to recover the
value of a loan if the borrower fails to meet the required
interest charges or repayments. It is a protection for a lender
against a borrower's default.
Commercial bank. A financial institution that provides
banking services, such as taking deposits and providing
credit facilities and loans. Commercial banks differ from retail
banks as they execute transactions not only with individuals,
but also with small businesses and corporations. Commercial
banking activities also differ from investment banking
activities, which include underwriting, facilitating mergers,
etc.
Commercial loan. A loan extended by commercial banks or
development finance agencies at commercial rates, i.e.
interest rates that reflect market conditions.
Community based organisation (CBO). CBOs are non-profit
societies created by communities to address local needs.
They are governed by volunteer boards of directors and
staffed by paid personnel. Some CBOs are also supported by
volunteers. If some CBOs are self-funded, many of them
receive funding from a variety of sources, including grants,
donations, fees, fundraising and government subsidies.
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Concessional loan (or 'soft' loan). A loan provided on
concessional lending terms, which may include a lower
interest rate (than the market rate), a longer repayment
period or a grace period. The IFIs providing soft loans can do
so either because they benefit from direct subsidies or are
able to access market finance at better conditions than
traditional banks (thanks to a high credit rating).
Equity investments. Equity investments are a form of finance
in which investors take an 'equity stake', which means that
they purchase shares in an entity. This enables them to share
the risk of that entity (through fluctuations in the share price)
in return for the prospect of sharing its profits (through
dividend payments). The higher the investment risk, the
higher the expected level of return.
Foundations. Foundations are non-profit public or private
organisations addressing development issues. They provide
grants to support specific development research or projects
in developing countries. They would often select the types of
areas and challenges they are targeting. For example, the Bill
& Melinda Gates Foundation has recently announced that it
will focus on the sanitation sector, whilst the Stone Family
Foundation is launching a competition for innovative water
projects.
Grace period. A period during which no interest payment is
due on a loan. This period usually takes place immediately
after the loan has been received. Such a grace period can be
particularly useful for WATSAN investments which are usually
made up front and only generate a stream of revenues
(necessary to repay the loan) over time.
Grant. A grant is a form of development aid without
repayment obligations. Grants might be untied or carry
explicit or implied political and commercial obligations.
Grants are usually provided by IFIs, governments, foundations
and specific funds with different policies, procedures and
technical products. A grant can be blended with other kinds
of finance to produce a suitable financing package for a
particular project.
Guarantee. A guarantee is a contract by a third party (C) to
underwrite a financial commitment entered into by two
parties (A and B). Guarantees can be used by national
governments to reduce the risks of borrowing and bond
issues by their sub-sovereign bodies and by international
agencies to increase the creditworthiness of developing
country institutions and support specific projects within
them. Common types of guarantees for large projects are
Political Risk Insurance, Partial Credit Guarantee and Partial
Risk Guarantee. Those types of guarantees would not typically
be used for SSF recipient however.
Informal sector. Economic activities that are not recorded by
the state, regulated by labour or taxation laws or monitored
for inclusion in gross domestic product estimates. The
informal sector may include, for example, water sellers, street
vendors, buskers, shoe-shiners, etc.
Institutional investor. Institutions, such as an insurance
company holding the savings of others, which are able to
invest in bulk in suitable outlets.
Leasing. Leasing is a contract, which enables one party (the
lessee) to have the right to use equipment by paying small
instalments to the party that owns the equipment (the lessor).
Leveraging. Using an injection of finance to induce other
contributions and thereby generating a multiple of the
original amount. It can also refer to the ratio of debt to equity
in a company's capital structure.
Mesofinance. Mesofinance deals with the financing
requirements of small businesses (e. g. small-scale WATSAN
providers) that are not covered by large or international
banks. These needs can range between USD 2000 and 
USD 100,000.
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Microcredit. Microcredit refers to small loans for borrowers
(up to roughly USD 2000, but more frequently in the range
USD 50 to USD 250) with little or no collateral. Microcredit is
typically provided to micro entrepreneurs for income-
generating activities, but can also be provided to households
for home improvement.
Microfinance. Microfinance typically refers to schemes for
extending credit, savings, insurance, money transfers and
other financial products to small-business, farmers and other
low-income borrowers who cannot get access to normal bank
loans.
Microfinance institution (MFI). An MFI is an organisation that
provides financial services to clients who are poorer and
more vulnerable than traditional bank clients. Most MFIs
started as not-for-profit organisation, like NGOs, credit unions
and other financial cooperatives, and state owned
development and postal savings banks. An increasing
number of MFIs are now organised as for-profit entities, often
because it is a requirement for obtaining a license from
banking authorities to offer savings services.
Micro investment vehicle (MIV). MIVs are private entities
which act as intermediaries between investors and MFIs.
MIVs receive investments generally from IFIs by issuing
shares, units, bonds, grants, equity investments or other
financial instruments. These resources are then pooled and
sometimes blended to provide efficient and targeted financial
support to MFIs, in such forms as debt, equity or guarantees.
The diversity of MIVs (self-managed or not, profit seeking or
not, investing in individual MFIs or in other MIVs) makes it
possible for many different types of investors to become
involved in the SSF sector.
'Missing middle'. This expression refers to a market segment
made up by small-scale entrepreneurs who cannot access the
traditional commercial market funding and whose financial
needs are above the lending capacity of MFIs.
Multi-donor trust fund (MDTF). A MDTF pools donors'
resources in a single trust fund account for a developing
country, region or sector. Generally a trust fund committee
composed of representatives from all contributing donors and
sometimes national authorities oversees the use of the
MDTF's resources. For donors, the MDTF is a funding channel
for countries or projects in which they would not otherwise
have become engaged. For water projects, MDTF can enhance
aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs and mitigating
and managing the high risk levels inherent in SSF.
Output-based aid (OBA). OBA is grant aid offered for specific
projects or programmes, which is not disbursed until the
recipient can demonstrate that the project is successfully
completed and the ongoing provision of services is
independently verified. These types of results-based subsidies
have been used extensively in the telecommunications or
energy sectors, and to a lesser extent in the WATSAN sector.
Repayable finance. Repayable finance refers to sources of
finance that ultimately need to be repaid, such as loans,
microfinance, bonds or equity.
Revolving fund. A revolving fund mechanism is one where
funds are revolved, i.e. loan repayments and interest earned
are used to provide new loans. The interest covers
administrative costs and helps prevent the fund from being
depleted as a result of such factors as inflation, non-
payments and the cost to the lender of getting outside
finance. The initial supply of lending capital usually comes
from the public sector (IFIs, development banks, national
governments, etc) and the funds might be used to extend
small loans to households or entrepreneurs. The repayment
of the loan, together with interest, is used to replenish the
fund and make further loans. In this way, the fund revolves in
that borrowers' repayments are used to finance later loans.
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Savings group schemes. A savings group scheme enables
members of the group to save small amounts and rotate the
available funds to group members for investment. There are
several types of savings group schemes, depending on the
number of people served, the amounts of savings and the
credit options available to their members, as described below.
 Rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA). The 
ROSCA method is the simplest and most widely used type 
of savings group. An informal association of 8–15 
participants makes daily contributions to a common fund 
which is given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in 
turn. Given that the money is redistributed at the same 
time that it is collected, no record keeping skills and 
money storage facility are needed. Once a member has
received the funds, they must continue to contribute, but
will not receive the lump sum again until all the members
have had a chance of receiving it once. ROSCAs serve both
loan and savings needs for small investments.
 Accumulating savings and credit association (ASCA). The 
ASCA is a more flexible form of informal savings group. 
The contributions collected at each group meeting are 
accumulated rather than redistributed at the end of each 
meeting (as in a ROSCA). With the large amount of savings
accumulated over time, the group can lend to its members
free of interest or with interest. Interest earned on loans
can become income earned for savers (stakeholders of the
loans) adding an incentive for a member to maintain their 
savings with the group. ASCAs serve both savings and 
credit needs in a flexible way. Credits are used for 
expected expenses (marriage, education), unexpected 
emergencies (accident, fire) and investment (such as for a 
water tank or buying a cow).
 Savings and credit cooperatives (SACCO) or Credit unions. 
A credit union operates like an ASCA, but serves a much 
larger membership (from a low of 100 to several thousand) 
and offers a wider range of savings and credit services to its
members, who are not reached by local commercial banks. 
Credit unions are formal institutions and usually chartered 
under the cooperative or credit union law of the respective 
country. Credit union funds are also normally kept in a bank
for safekeeping. Members are free to come to the credit
union office anytime during office hours and no regular 
attendance at meetings is required. They can operate 
individual accounts, make savings deposits and 
withdrawals, earn interest on their savings and pay interest
on loans they take from the credit union.
Seed financing. Seed financing refers to the injection of the
initial equity capital provided to start a new enterprise or as a
basis for attracting commercial finance. It can also refer to the
initial funding provided to a revolving fund or a lending
scheme. Money used for initial investment in a project or
start-up company, for proof-of-concept, market research, or
initial product development is also called seed financing or
seed money.
Self-help group (SHG). A SHG is a locally-based financial
intermediary usually composed of 10 to 20 local women.
Members come together on a voluntary basis to regularly
save small sums of money, contributing to a common fund.
When there is enough capital in the group, funds are then
lent back to members to meet their consumption or business
needs. The group members use collective wisdom and peer
pressure to ensure proper end-use of credit and timely
repayment. SHGs are widely used by MFIs and commercial
banks as intermediaries for the delivery of microcredit. Unlike
ROSCAs, SHGs receive loans from formal banking institutions
to supplement their resources.
Small-scale finance (SSF). SSF is defined as financing below
approximately USD 100,000. It covers both microfinance
(including small loans below a few thousand Euros) and
mesofinance, particularly to SMEs.
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Small-scale finance (SSF) recipient. SSF recipients include
small-scale WATSAN service providers, ranging from
households, small-scale independent providers (SSIPs),
SMEs, to equipment providers, CBOs, NGO user committees
and local governments. These may also include small utilities
when those do not have access to standard financial
channels.
Small-scale independent providers (SSIPs). SSIPs are
typically self-employed entrepreneurs who provide water
supply and/or sanitation services to a segment of the
population. SSIPs often play a key role in low-income
neighbourhoods not serviced by municipal networks as well
as in smaller towns where municipalities are not providing
adequate water supply and sanitation services.
Smart subsidies. Smart subsidies are subsidies that are
transparent, rule-bound and time-limited. With respect to
microfinance, smart subsidies refer to subsidies provided to
financial institutions to develop financial products that target
the poor, through soft funding for market research, product
development or staff training.
Social performance. Social performance is defined by the
Social Performance Task Force as, "The effective translation of
an institution's mission into practice in line with accepted
social values." Commonly accepted social values include
providing financial and/or non-financial services to greater
numbers of poor and excluded people, improving the quality
and relevance of services already being offered, reducing
poverty, creating certain benefits for clients (e.g. increased
revenue from their businesses, greater sense of
empowerment, decreased vulnerability), and improving an
MFI's impact on the environment or the community.
Subsidies. A subsidy is a grant given generally by the
government to economic actors in various forms, such as a
cash transfer, a tax reduction or inputs at lower prices (such
as free land). A subsidy can be given to economic actors as
an incentive to deliver goods and/or services that benefit
society. A subsidy can also be provided to households below
the poverty line to enable them to access basic goods and
services. Subsidies are sometimes provided to support utility
infrastructure projects and may include 'hardware subsidies'
(to reduce the initial capital investment costs), 'operating
subsidies' (to cover losses incurred during service operation)
or 'software subsidies' (to cover the software costs
associated with infrastructure development, such as for
project preparation, capacity building and training).
Sub-sovereign financing. Financing provided to sub-
sovereign levels of administration, including regional and
state governments, municipalities, and specialised
infrastructure financing agencies (such as utilities). The
financial standing of these sub-sovereign institutions is
crucial to enable them to attract loan financing. They may
need a central government guarantee in order to do so at
affordable lending rates.
Tariffs. Tariffs are payments made by users of WATSAN
services for access to and use of the services. A number of
additional charges may be payable to the service provider,
such as meter rental, penalty charges (for late payment or
tampering with the meter), etc. Cross-subsidies, i.e. tariffs
paid by other user groups or users of other services (e.g.,
users of electricity services when the two services are
combined) are included in 'tariffs'. When the service is self-
provided (e.g., when a household builds and operates their
household latrine), the equity invested by the household (in
the form of cash, material or time – 'sweat equity') would
also fall under 'tariffs' as defined by the OECD.
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Taxes. Taxes refer to funds originating from domestic taxes
which are channelled to the sector through transfers from all
levels of government, national, regional or local. Such funds
would typically be provided as subsidies for capital
investment or operations. 'Hidden' forms of subsidies may
include tax rebates, soft loans (i.e. at a subsidised interest
rate), transfers from local government, housing taxes,
donations, subsidised services (such as subsidised
electricity) or 'dormant' equity investments.
Transfers. Transfers refer to funds from international donors
and charitable foundations (including NGOs, decentralised
cooperation or local civil society organisations) that typically
come from sources external to the country, i.e. are
contributed by tax payers or individual donors in other
countries. These funds can be contributed either in the form
of grants, concessionary loans (i.e. loans that include a
'grant' element in the form of a subsidised interest rate or a
grace period) or guarantees.
Utilities. Utilities are agencies that are responsible for
providing networked public services, such as water, sewerage
or electricity. They may be either public or private.
Water and sanitation (WATSAN) services. Refer to all water
services provided through manmade capital that deal with
the supply of drinking WATSAN services. This includes piped
and non-piped water services, as well as on-site and
networked sanitation.
68
Annex C. Useful resources
C.1. Useful websites
On microfinance
http://www.cgap.org – CGAP is an independent policy and
research centre dedicated to advancing financial access for
the world's poor. It is supported by over 30 development
agencies and private foundations who share a common
mission to alleviate poverty. Housed at the World Bank, CGAP
provides market intelligence, promotes standards, develops
innovative solutions and offers advisory services to
governments, financial service providers, donors, and
investors.
www.microfinancegateway.org – A service of CGAP, the
Microfinance Gateway is possibly the most comprehensive
online resource for the global community dedicated to
advancing financial services for the poor.
www.themix.org – The Microfinance Information Exchange
(MIX) is a non-profit organisation established in Washington
DC in 2002 with regional offices in Azerbaijan, India, Morocco
and Peru. It is the leading business information provider
dedicated to strengthening the microfinance sector. The
organisation's core focus is to provide objective data and
analysis on microfinance providers and, more specifically,
financial and social performance information. Services
include collection and analysis of data, creation of best
practice and standards for the microfinance industry. The MIX
has a social performance assessment tool.
www.mixmarket.org – This website is managed by MIX and
supported by international organisations and charitable
foundations interested in microfinance. MIX provides
objective, qualified and relevant performance information on
MFIs, funders, networks and service providers dedicated to
serving the financial sector needs for low-income clients. MIX
market provides instant access to financial and social
performance information covering approximately 2000 MFIs
around the world. It is an informative and user-friendly
website which provides an instant picture of which MFIs are
active in a given country.
http://www.sptf.info – The Social Performance Task Force
(SPTF) consists of over 1000 members from all over the world
and from every microfinance stakeholder group. It includes
practitioners, donors and investors (multilateral, bilateral and
private), global, national and regional associations, TA
providers, rating agencies, academics, researchers and
others. The SPTF's mission is to engage with microfinance
stakeholders to develop, disseminate and promote standards
and good practices for social performance management and
reporting. It will achieve this by:
 Providing a platform for dialogue, learning and 
collaboration;
 Working toward setting industry standards for social
performance management, measurement, monitoring, 
reporting and training;
 Promoting good practices and the demonstrated 
successes of MFIs engaged in social performance 
management;
 Gathering quality evidence and research to demonstrate 
the business case for social performance management.
http://www.e-mfp.eu – The European Microfinance Platform
(E-MFP) is a network of European MFIs promoting cooperation
between members working in developing countries, by
facilitating exchange of information and capacity building. It
organises an annual conference and supports research
initiatives, including research on issues such as sustainability
and targeting the poor.
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http://www.ruralfinance.org – The Rural Finance Learning
Centre is a website assisting organisations in developing
countries to build their capacity to deliver improved financial
services which meet the needs of rural households and
businesses.
http://watercredit.org – WaterCredit is an initiative of
Water.org that puts microfinance tools to use in the WATSAN
sector. The WaterCredit.org website has been designed with
different types of stakeholders in mind; MFIs, sector experts,
catalytic philanthropists, social investors and commercial
banks. It provides information on the WaterCredit programme
as well as background on how microfinance can be used to
boost access to WATSAN.
http://financialaccess.org – The Financial Access Initiative is
a consortium of leading development economists focused on
substantially expanding access to quality financial services
for low-income individuals. Launched with a USD 5 million
grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in late 2006,
the Initiative is housed at the Wagner Graduate School of
Public Service, New York University. The website contains a
wealth of articles and publications on increasing access to
financial services for poor people.
On WATSAN
www.euwi.net/wg/finance – The European Union Water
Initiative (EUWI) was launched at the Johannesburg Summit in
2002 to create the conditions for mobilising all available EU
resources (human and financial) and to coordinate them to
achieve the water-related MDGs in partner countries. The
website presents EUWI's activities and contains an extensive
library of water-related resources prepared with EUWI
support, including the activities of the FWG.
www.gwp.org – The Global Water Partnership (GWP) was
founded in 1996 by the World Bank, the United Nations
Development Programme, and the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) to foster integrated
water resource management. The website presents GWP's
activities and contains all GWP supported publications.
www.shareresearch.org – SHARE is a consortium of five
organisations which have come together to generate rigorous
and relevant research for use in the field of sanitation and
hygiene. SHARE is a five year initiative (2010–2015) funded
by DFID. The website contains sanitation sector news and
reports relative to research supported by SHARE.
www.wsp.org – WSP is a multi-donor partnership created in
1978 and administered by the World Bank to support poor
people in obtaining affordable, safe, and sustainable access
to WATSAN. The website contains a wealth of research reports
and technical notes on programmes conducted by WSP,
including for example on the K-Rep experience.
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